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ABSTRACT 
In the juncture of the unprecedented election of a Süryani-Keldani candidate as a member of 
the parliament of Turkey, and the subsequent discussions that elicited conflicting viewpoints 
regarding what it means to be a ‘proper’ ethnic subject, this study examines the intimate 
communities as manifested by these conflicts through citizenship and affect theories. It 
examines the structural inequalities that result in an affective historical presence, and the 
particular psychic mechanism of being a model minority in the case of the Süryani-Keldani, a 
Christian minority group in a predominantly Muslim nation. By demonstrating the institutional, 
political and psychical dynamics within the community, this study critiques multiculturalism’s 
tendency to essentialize and hierarchize ethnic identity through affect theory. It also 
implements para-ethnography in overcoming difficulties of ethnographic access.  
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ÖZET 
Süryani-Keldani bir adayın Türkiye Cumhuriyeti tarihinde ilk kez milletvekili seçilmesinden 
sonra toplum içinde yaşanan tartışmalarda bir takım görüş farklılıkları belirdi. Görüş 
farklılıklarının temelinde yatan sebep kimin daha “doğru” bir etnik özne olduğu hakkındaki 
görüş ayrılığıydı. Bu çalışma vatandaşlık ve duygulanım teorilerini kullanarak tartışmalarda 
dışavurulan “samimi” toplulukları inceliyor. Tarihi olayların etkisiyle oluşan şimdiki zamanın 
yapısal eşitsizliklerini, model azınlık olma durumuyla beliren ruhsal mekanizmaları inceleyerek 
büyük çoğunluğu Müslüman olan bu ülkede Süryani-Keldanilerin Hristiyan bir azınlık olma 
durumunu anlamaya çalışıyor. Toplumdaki kurumsal, politik ve ruhsal dinamikleri inceleyerek 
çokkültürcülüğün etnik kimliği tekilleştirme eğilimini duygulanım teorisini kullanarak 
eleştiriyor. Ayrıca para-etnografik çalışmanın etnografik engellerin üstesinden gelinmesinde 
yarattığı kolaylıkları inceliyor. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
Süryani-Keldani are native Christians of Mesopotamia, a community whose existence is 
relatively not well known due to lack of a nation state and ensuing lack of history 
writing. Süryani-Keldani have been living in the geography of Beth Nahrin for 
thousands of years. Beth Nahrin means the “Land of the Rivers” in one of the native 
languages of Süryani-Keldani, Suryoyo, and it spans the area that is also known as 
Mesopotamia, consisting of parts of southern Turkey, northern Iraq, eastern Syria and 
western Iran. Provinces of Diyarbakır, Mardin, Urfa, Antakya, Şırnak and Hakkari of 
modern day Turkey once housed a vibrant Süryani-Keldani community along with 
other communities, most of whom were displaced, massacred, or migrated in large 
numbers as a result of a series of tumultuous events spanning late 19th and early 20th 
century. A small number of approximately 25,000 Süryani-Keldani still remain in 
Turkey despite the extensive emigration abroad, and live mainly in İstanbul, Mardin, 
Midyat, and Antakya, as well as small villages in southeastern Turkey. The community 
in Istanbul makes up a big portion of those who were participants to this ethnographic 
study.  
 
Süryani-Keldani community in Turkey attends a number of different churches, such as 
Assyrian Orthodox Church, Assyrian Catholic Church, Assyrian Protestant Church, 
Chaldean Church, and the Nestorian Church. These various ecclesiastic formations 
result from a lack of a state or empire in the nation’s history. Due to the lack of a central 
power, regional churches asserted their individual authorities and regulated the daily 
affairs of their local communities, hence giving rise to different nodes of power in the 
form of different churches. A brief history and outline of ecclesiastic formations are 
summarized in the next chapter.  
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Often people are surprised to hear the existence of this community of Christians in 
Turkey. However, there is a sizeable Christian community in the Middle East and Arab 
countries.1 In fact, next to the numerous Christian villages in pre-war Iraq, the numbers 
of Süryani-Keldani in Turkey are scarce. America’s recent war in Iraq caused many 
Christians to flee as they have consistently been threatened by their lives in the 
environment of insecurity created during and after the war. An interlocutor fleeing from 
the violence in northern Iraq said, “Before the war there was poverty. Now, it is not a 
safe place to live [for Christians]. I was threatened by my life to leave.” Iraq, Syria, 
Lebanon, and Egypt are only a few countries that have a sizeable Christian population. 
Tarık Aziz, one of Saddam Hussein’s top aides and minister of foreign affairs to Iraq, 
was a Süryani-Keldani. In Lebanon, Christians have historically been involved in 
government ranks. Syria also has a sizeable Christian community. 
 
Ethnography for this study was conducted mainly among the members of the Keldani2 
church in Istanbul. However, it is incredibly hard to ethnographically delineate 
members of this particular church from those who belong to other Süryani-Keldani 
churches, since people have been living together and joining in matrimony for years, 
and often claim that they are the same people. Therefore the findings of this study can 
be generalized to the community of Süryani-Keldani who live in Istanbul at large. 
Unfortunately, this study has not yet been extended to the community in southeastern 
Turkey. 
 
Even though Turkey is supposedly a “cradle of civilizations” in the romantic national 
imaginary, sadly most of these civilizations are relegated to dilapidated churches, empty 
schools, and abandoned villages. The Christian population of Turkey is virtually 
nonexistent compared to the bordering countries of Syria and Iraq, especially the Iraqi 
community before the war, which caused many Christians to escape. Süryani-Keldani 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 For a table representing the populations of Süryani-Keldani worldwide, refer to 
http://www.aina.org/brief.html. This table is dated 2007 and gives the numbers of 
Süryani-Keldani in Turkey as 24,000; 1,500,000 in Iraq; 700,000 in Syria; 50,000 in 
2 The English equivalent for the term Keldani is “Chaldean”. The word “Chaldean” can 
be substituted with “Keldani”. However, due to confusions around naming, part of 
which also arise from problems of translation, I use the term Keldani as it was the 
preferred term in most of the fieldwork. Refer to the next chapter for a discussion on 
ambiguities of naming. 
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suffered from extensive massacres culminating in the genocide of 1915, in which they 
shared the fate of Armenians. Discriminatory and incendiary politics towards Süryani-
Keldani continued after the genocide and during the republic of Turkey, and still 
continue, the most recent example being their depiction in history textbooks as 
“traitors” in October 20113. Süryani-Keldani population of Turkey has been 
consistently depleting. It is in this eerie present that one can begin to conceptualize 
what it means to be a Christian or Jewish subject in Turkey. This study intends to 
provide an ethnographic account of what it means to be a Süryani-Keldani subject in 
Istanbul by studying both the structural inequalities and the psychic mechanisms of 
engagement with one’s racialization. I use citizenship and affect theories in defining 
and understanding what I have referred to as “intimate communities” (Aretxaga 1995) 
and the conditions of being a “model minority,” a concept elaborated by race theorist 
Anne Cheng (Cheng 2001) that has been a very useful in understanding the dynamics 
within the Süryani-Keldani community. This study happens in the juncture of the 
unprecedented election of a Süryani-Keldani candidate as a member of the parliament 
of Turkey, which raised numerous discussions regarding what it means to be a Süryani-
Keldani subject. I analyze the importance of Dora’s election and the reactions 
surrounding his election in order to demonstrate this relatively small community as a 
layered, evolving, and connected group. 
 
 
1.1. Erol Dora 
 
 
Erol Dora was elected a member of the parliament on June 12, 2011, being the first 
Keldani-Süryani politician ever to be represented in the parliament of Turkey. Dora’s 
election was considered a huge success in terms of cultural representation within the 
republic, which is the reason why he was invited to numerous interviews on mainstream 
TV channels. However, Dora’s call for the need for increased freedoms challenged 
what he seemed to represent—a happy multicultural nation that is able to choose a 
minority as a member of the parliament. Instead, Dora expressed a need for increased 
freedoms in terms of rights. He expressed the discontents around lack of linguistic 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Bianet, “Tarih kitapları Yine Sınıfta Kaldı”, Emre Ertani, October 1, 2001. 
http://www.bianet.org/biamag/genclik/133082-tarih-kitaplari-yine-sinifta-kaldi 
Retrieved 30.11.2011. 
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rights, the difficulties faced by Christian foundations, and conflicts around ethnic 
identity for the Süryani-Keldani population. In a nutshell, Dora demonstrated a need for 
a true multicultural state, as opposed to the boutique multiculturalism, a concept 
elaborated by Fish (Fish 1997), and analyzed within the context of Turkey by Yumul 
(Yumul 2005). 
 
Multiculturalism, as defined by Kymlicka, is intended to overcome the inequalities 
created by a person’s belonging to a minority group, and its main tenet of practice is 
group-differentiated rights for self-determined groups. Recent reforms in Turkey have 
given limited freedoms to the use of minority languages that have mainly taken the 
form of decriminalizing certain activities, such as speaking Kurdish in a public arena. 
However, none of these changes have taken the form of group-differentiated rights. 
Moreover, minorities are still being depicted in negative ways, such as the recent 
portrayal of Süryani-Keldani as “traitors” in national history books for primary schools 
published in 2011, or the casting of any single attempt for Kurdish rights as “terrorism” 
by the ministry of internal affairs in December, 2011, 4 all of which continue to cast 
minority identities or minority rights as undesirable, despite the seemingly liberating 
practices. 
 
Even though advances are made in certain areas in terms of rights, Turkey continues to 
be a nation that is not multicultural, as increasing liberties are followed by unpunished 
discriminatory acts, hence demonstrating the lack of a motivation to preserve minority 
identities or overcome inequalities of being a minority. Structural inequalities persist as 
well, such as the practices that make it very hard for churches to maintain their 
structural or financial integrity, whereas there is practically a government organization 
that supports the building of mosques and collects donations intended for the upkeep 
and maintenance of mosques, namely the Ministry of Religion. Yumul describes 
Turkey as being a country of “boutique multiculturalism,” which describes “a cosmetic 
relationship to the objects of affection” (Fish 378), such as appreciation of minority 
music, food, traditions, and buildings, however a reluctance to accord minorities any 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Radikal, “İçişleri Bakanı'ndan yeni terör tarifleri” December 26, 2011, 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Default.aspx?aType=Detay&VersionID=7965&Date=22.06.
2008&ArticleID=1073629 
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rights, and a reluctance to deny certain groups what they deem as their core values. For 
example, a person can enjoy attending Christmas mass and listening to the Christmas 
hymns in San Antoine in Istanbul, however s/he can deny the right for churches to 
collect donations from their constituency, hence demonstrating inherent biases about 
acceptable modes of presence, and a denial of minority rights. 
 
According to Yumul, one of the ways in which boutique multiculturalism plays out in 
Turkey is through a discourse of pity, by depicting the minority as a pitiful group that 
has almost disappeared completely (Yumul 2005:97), yet a failure to do anything to 
ensure its presence and well-being. The boutique multiculturalism of Turkey functions 
only to depict minorities as “cultural enrichments” to an essentially “Turkish,” and 
hence “Muslim,” dominant identity. Furthermore, these boutique presences are used to 
affirm the “cultural” state of the nation, by representing it as a place where minorities 
lead happy and good lives. 
 
The assassination of Hrant Dink on January 19, 2007, an Armenian intellectual, 
journalist and editor of the Armenian-Turkish newspaper Agos, and the debates that 
followed his death, mark a new territory in terms of multiculturalism in Turkey. Even 
though the tragic death of Dink and the ineffectiveness of the legal process continue to 
haunt and depress, the debates that followed Dink’s assasination in the last 5 years mark 
a new phase of minority rights and issues in Turkey. It was Dink’s death that allowed 
for a wider public discussion and engagement with minority issues and history of 
minority oppression in the mainstream media and public sphere. The debates following 
Dink’s assasination reminded the public of an obscured past of minority oppression that 
was carefully hidden from history textbooks and mainstream media, a past that was at 
best distanced to an ancient and removed “Ottoman” realm for the majority of the 
population. Since Dink’s assasination, discussions over minority rights have become 
mainstream. Armenians have started talking about the genocide, and others have 
followed their example. Hardly a week passes by in which a minority issue is not  
referred to in mainstream media, even though some of these referrals continue to be 
discriminatory and incendiary in manner.  
 
Similar advances have also been made in terms of Kurdish rights. Whereas 30 years ago 
people could be sentenced to jail for claiming that they are Kurdish, now the debate has 
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moved from the denial of a sociological reality to a discussion of rights and political 
representation. However, similar to the debates on religious minority issues, the fact 
that the arena of sayable and unsayable things have altered does not entail that Turkey 
has become a multicultural nation. Turkey remains to be a nation that is conservative in 
terms of individual liberties, linguistic and cultural rights, one that forbids, punishes, or 
incites anger towards criticisms of official state policy or challenges to its particular 
interpretation of history. It is still the state that dictates the limits of what is acceptable 
and unacceptable in terms of rights, who can benefit from which rights and who is 
excluded, and the state has an upper hand in determining preconditions for liberties and 
is the institution that grants liberties. Since 2004, government has been purportedly 
increasing liberties to Kurdish people by allowing Kurdish media a very narrow and 
apolitical liberty to exist, and punishing the media channels heavily if they fail to abide 
by the nation’s code of sayable and unsayable things. There are advances in media that 
allow people to pratice Kurdish, however this has not stopped the stigmitization of 
Kurdish in primary schools or its stigmatization as a political language. Editors of the 
Kurdish newspaper Ozgur Gundem have been sentenced to over 100 years of 
imprisonment, while only particularly cultural issues are permitted to exist. Despite 
increased liberties, elected members of the parliament have been barred from 
parliamentary representation. Government has recently engaged in another wave of 
military attacks against PKK, which will be the basis on which many liberties are 
rescinded since any news that criticize military attacks or speaks on behalf of modes of 
Kurdish liberation will be going against the grain of national ideology and military 
intervention, and thus heavily punishable. It is this increased attention to minority issues 
as has been advanced following the assasination of Dink, and the increasingly political 
demands for Kurdish cultural, social, civic and political rights, that provide the context 
leading to the election of Dora as a member of the candidate as a Süryani-Keldani, as 
well as contextualize the dynamics within the Süryani-Keldani community in İstanbul.  
 
Erol Dora’s remarks were significant because he reflected a need for increased 
freedoms for the Süryani-Keldani community, essentially criticizing the state for failing 
to be a multicultural state. The remarks caused a stir in the community, as people 
disagreed whether such rights were necessary or not, eliciting conflicting viewpoints 
regarding what it means to be a proper ethnic subject. There was a flurry of discussions 
following Dora’s nomination, election, and his speeches, which reflected the layered 
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and varied dispositions within the community. In his speeches, Dora often portrayed the 
community as lacking access to cultural rights, and demonstrated that there is a need 
within the community for increased equalities. Dora’s remarks, while expressing the 
needs and desires of a particular Süryani-Keldani community, shocked others within the 
same community who had pitched their lives as non-problematic and contended, thus 
bringing to focus a shortfall of multicultural policies.  
 
Terence Turner draws attention to multiculturalism’s tendency to hierarchize ethnic 
communities due to its essentialization and reification ethnic identity. According to 
Turner, multiculturalism’s deficiency comes from a misconception of “culture” as 
either an autonomous domain of symbols and practices disconnected from social, 
political and economic circumstances, or by its canonization of an elite aesthetic 
criteria, which in this case plays out as linguistic and national intactness, following 
from the image of nation-states. By demonstrating that ethnicities are not necessarily 
homogenous groups that uniformly aspire for linguistic and national intactness, this 
thesis engages in a criticism of multiculturalism’s tendency to essentialize ethnic 
identity, and attempts to show how a certain understanding of multiculturalism that 
reifies distinctions along ethnic lines recreates an evolutionist understanding of cultural 
difference that deems certain existences as inferior to others, a notion that 
multiculturalism had initially set out to dismantle through decentering the dominant 
notions of high culture (Turner 1993). I engage in a similar criticism of multiculturalism 
by demonstrating the intimate communities manifested by the debates that followed 
Dora’s election. These conflicting viewpoints were epitomized by the responses that 
were published in the columns of a widely read Turkish newspaper Hürriyet, and also 
on Süryani-Keldani discussion forums, both of which I use in this thesis for analysis. I 
employ citizenship and affect theories in examining the intimate communities as 
manifested by these conflicts, and the reasons that have lead to the formation of these 
intimate communities. I examine in particular the dynamics of being a model minority 
(Cheng 2001), and the instances in which discourse of model minority ceases to 
function, such as when Dora announces the need for increased liberties. By 
demonstrating the dynamics within the Süryani-Keldani community through affect 
theory, I offer a critique of multiculturalism’s tendency to essentialize and hierarchize 
ethnic identity.  
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1.2. Fieldwork 
 
 
I conducted eight months of fieldwork mainly within the community of the Keldani 
Church in Istanbul, and only partial fieldwork within the diasporic population in various 
European countries, among the first and second generation of Süryani-Keldani to have 
migrated from Turkey. Most interviews were conducted in Turkish, hence with 
Süryani-Keldani who were either born and lived within the borders of Turkey, or who 
migrated abroad at a later age or only recently. A few interviews were conducted in 
English with people from Iraq or those born in European countries, as well as with 
people who either do not wish to speak Turkish due to personal reasons or forgotten 
Turkish due to lack of use. In the fieldwork I encountered numerous methods of self-
referral, such as Süryani, Assyrian, Keldani, Asurlu, the reasons behind which will also 
be explicated in the following chapter. Suffice it now to say that there is definitely a 
sense of ethnic community that evades all contention, and I use the term “Süryani-
Keldani” to refer to the community at large. Next chapter includes a further discussion 
regarding my choice to use the term “Süryani-Keldani”. 
 
I conducted semi-structured interviews with people of ages ranging from 17 to 
seventies, women, men, and youth, and with interlocutors from varying socioeconomic 
backgrounds. Among the people with whom I conducted interviews are refugees from 
Iraq who were fleeing the anti-Christian atmosphere in post-invasion Iraq, priests, 
people who have studied in monasteries in Turkey, businessmen, students, people who 
have recently migrated to Istanbul from other parts of Turkey, people whose siblings 
have recently migrated to European countries such as France or Belgium, people who 
fled Turkey as young adults, and people who think that they are banned from entering 
Turkey because they have been pursuing activist work regarding the genocide of 
Süryani-Keldani in 1915. 
 
I engaged in in-depth conversations and interviewed with about 27 people in Istanbul 
and in Rijssen. Most of the fieldwork in Istanbul was recorded. The seminar in Rijssen 
was also recorded, however since individual conversations often happened over coffee 
breaks and continued over several coffee breaks, occurred during dinner or in the hotel 
lobby, in field trips or car rides, I needed to resort to taking notes, even though I paid 
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attention to writing down longer quotes and I took notes fastidiously. All recordings 
were transcribed, and fieldnotes are extensive. Since the community is relatively small, 
I changed people’s real names in order to prevent people from being identified, even 
though most people said that they would not have a problem even if their real names 
were mentioned.  I refrained from providing exact locations or in-depth explications of 
family structures or homes in an effort to prevent identification. I merged different life 
stories into single personalities during the writing phase of the thesis, thereby giving 
rise to typologies instead of complex humans, exemplified by Zekiye and Nathali. 
While this is far from ideal, I did so intentionally in an effort to disguise people’s 
identities. If the community were larger, a simple methodological maneuver of 
changing names would suffice, but the small size of the community necessitated that I 
also change and merge people’s stories. In order to overcome possible errors of 
typecasting while building typologies, I introduced quotes from different parts of the 
population that demonstrate the variety of opinions and varying modes of existences, 
hence moving the theoretical points of this thesis across a continuum of interlocutors 
instead of remaining restricted to typologies.  
 
I did multi-sited fieldwork in the church, in offices, in people’s homes, and on the way 
to the subway (Marcus 1995). I conducted fieldwork during a conference in Rijssen, the 
Netherlands, and in a fieldtrip to a monastery. Most interesting findings happened when 
I thought fieldwork was over and had turned off the recorder—walking home with an 
interlocutor as she was confronted by her Christian identity by a neighbor, who 
threatened her by saying “you should be more mindful of parking your car in 
inappropriate places and making enemies, especially because you are a foreigner”. The 
fact that such a confrontation could occur even over such a simple matter as a parking 
dispute, and seeing the way she dealt with such accusations, observing her well picked 
words which demonstrated that she had to deal with such circumstances many times 
before, her ease at getting over a confrontation that had left me dumbfounded and with 
goosebumps, was invaluable to the ethnographic analysis. 
 
The fieldwork I did in Rijssen, the Netherlands, is not comprehensive; however it has 
been crucial in framing my arguments about the community in Turkey. The fieldwork 
in Rijssen was only partial, and the diasporic communities certainly need to be studied 
in much more detail and depth, but I believe that the participants to the conference in 
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Rijssen qualify as a representative sample for the purposes of this study, and hence I 
have used my ethnographic findings in Rijssen in demonstrating some of the differences 
between the community in Istanbul and the community in the diaspora. 
 
The fieldwork in Rijssen was conducted among the diasporic Süryani-Keldani 
academicians and experts from various countries, including Germany, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Poland, England, and the USA, who had come together under the 
rubric of a conference on the Süryani-Keldani genocide. The participants actively 
engaged with questions of history and identity, thus providing a contrast to certain 
communities in Turkey. Their level of engagement was also refreshing as it informed 
me about the ways in which one can engage with one’s ethnicity. Among this group, 
chats over history and racial identity occured even during ten-minute coffee breaks, car 
rides, or over dinner. I spoke with and listened to the presentations of Süryani-Keldani 
academicians and activists—linguists, historians, anthropologists, archivists, who had 
their own insights regarding the community, thus making the fieldwork para-
ethnographic (Holmes & Marcus). Moreover, they referred me to and shared with me 
numerous sources of information that do not exist or do not dare to exist in Turkey, 
since history of Süryani-Keldani is not especially prominent even in academia, let alone 
publicly. In the last chapter, I engage in a further analysis of the fieldwork conducted in 
this setting in Rijssen, identify its para-ethnographic elements, and delineate its 
contribution to analysis.  
 
The Süryani-Keldani community in Europe, as represented by the sample in Rijssen, 
have escaped Turkey through migration. Currently, most of them are living in a 
community that is very actively questioning and demanding ethnic rights, unlike the 
community in Turkey who got entangled in a big debate after Erol Dora called for 
linguistic rights. The diasporic communities in Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, 
France and in the USA are generally more certain about their future securities and they 
know that they will not be punished by the state, individually or as a community, as a 
result of the things they say. On the other hand, fear and repression continue to guide 
the lives of Süryani-Keldani in Turkey to different extents, manifested by exaggerated 
stress on loyalty to the state, which casts the state as an entity that can easily be incited 
to wrath, therefore one that must be dealt with carefully and delicately, and must never 
be crossed. 
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I shuddered when I saw a huge camera set in the conference room in Rijssen where a 
group of people were discussing the genocide. It seemed that the presence of a camera 
did not bother anyone but me. If this ever happened in Turkey, I thought, the things that 
were said during the conference would have been used against the community as a part 
of incendiary politics. Certainly, people would fear that such incendiary politics will 
happen and they would not let this conference happen in the first place, let alone have it 
recorded on tape. The conference that will take place in Mardin, Turkey, in 2012 will 
provide a good ground for comparison of two contexts, Mardin and Rijssen, making 
another invaluable field for ethnography. In April 2012, Artuklu University in Mardin, 
Turkey, is hosting an international symposium on Süryani-Keldani history, archeology, 
language, culture, architecture, religion and literature. The symposium is hosted by the 
department of “Living Languages,” and was announced to the public as being about the 
“cultural interactions of Süryani-Keldani and others”5. The description of the 
symposium hints at being about the ancient and ecclesiastic history of the Süryani-
Keldani and ignores issues such as genocide. The description also seems to be 
apolitical. This symposium is also self-selective as a result of its location, because there 
were politically active people in the conference in Rijssen who confessed that they are 
banned from entering Turkey, and therefore probably will not be able to participate. 
There are at least two presenters who attended the conference in Rijssen, who will be 
attending the symposium in Mardin as well. I am certain that there will be presenters or 
participants who will broach into sensitive topics that the symposium description 
meticulously left out, and I am looking forward to seeing how this conference folds out, 
and comparing it with the conference in the Netherlands. 
 
Nahrin, a woman in her 40’s who has been living in Sweden since she was a teenager 
said, “When I went to Turkey to visit relatives in our town I found out that we failed to 
understand each other” implying differences that are beyond that of mechanical 
obstructions of language. However, parts of the community do interact. In most cases, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Mardin Artuklu University, “1. International Süryani Semposium: Süryani and Their 
Cultural Interactions with Other Cultures”, April 22-22 2012, Mardin, Turkey. 
Retrieved on Jan 2, 2012. http://www.artuklu.edu.tr/duyurular/page-yasayan-diller-
enstitusu-ilk-suryani-sempozyumunu-duzenliyor.aspx 
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nearly all relatives, except for close family members, live in the diaspora in Europe, 
USA or Australia. People interact over internet discussion forums. Family members 
visit each other. There is a passage of information between the community in Turkey 
and the community abroad. This study includes an analysis of these discussion forums 
as well, particularly those restricted to Turkish.  
 
Throughout the study, I was intensely aware of my positionality. I am proceeding with 
the knowledge that people I speak with might not be entirely honest about all their 
feelings, might be hiding certain facts, acting with the knowledge that a mis-interpreted 
information might bring the whole community into conflict with the state of Turkey, 
and hence proceeding cautiously and reservedly. Such a cautionary stance is 
pronounced when a person like me who does not belong to the community through 
religious or conjugal ties asks for an interview. However, silence about certain topics 
exists within the members of the community as well, in certain instances blocking the 
intergenerational passage of information. Despite the reserved nature of some 
interlocutors, others, especially the younger members of the community, gave me the 
feeling that they were sharing their thoughts without restraint. The cautious and 
reserved nature of the information transfer in the community in Turkey was especially 
stark in comparison to the community in Rijssen, who actively talked about inequalities 
and brutalities of history, such as Seyfo, the massacres of Süryani-Keldani in 1915, an 
issue that occurred only occasionally and often upon my insistence in the fieldwork in 
Turkey, and even when it was mentioned, it was quickly followed by declarations of 
loyalty to the state of Turkey. This phenomena, which is also sometimes referred to as 
the “minority psychology”6 in a maneuver to depoliticize and personalize what is 
intensely political and historical, makes the central point of this study. 
 
 
 
 
1.3. Outline of Thesis 
 
 
In the next chapter I briefly attempt to delineate a very basic history of the Süryani-
Keldani. Due to lack of a nation state that dictates its official history, history writing has 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 “azınlık psikolojisi” 
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a chance at dimensionality and needs to be supported by further research; however it is 
filled with ambivalences and is contentious. I also provide a brief overview of 
ecclesiastic formation of the Süryani-Keldani churches. I provide a recent history of 
Christians within the republic of Turkey, and examine the studies of scholars such as 
Mahçupyan and Oran in order to understand the historical bases of the current structural 
inequalities against minorities in Turkey and the shaping of public opinion.  
 
In the third chapter I present my ethnographic findings. I examine the conditions of the 
Süryani-Keldani community through citizenship theory of Silverstein, who moves the 
citizenship theories from that of a debate over rights discourses to a social practice and 
a surveilled performance, and therefore to an ethnographic study of citizenship. I refer 
to theories of affect in reconciling the structural biases towards minorities with the 
disparate remarks of parts of the community that purport a discourse of well-being that 
is belied by numerous migrations abroad as well as by Erol Dora’s remarks. I examine 
the structural conditions of the Süryani-Keldani through the definition of affective 
intimate communities, which were epitomized during the debates that followed Dora’s 
election. This study happens at the conjuncture in which Süryani-Keldani themselves 
have engaged in a discussion regarding their presence, rights, and notions of equality in 
purview of active Kurdish minority rights politics, an active diaspora, and active groups 
within the community in Turkey, specifically those in Mardin, and those that elected 
Dora, hence opting for political representation. 
 
I employ Aretxaga’s concept of ‘intimacy’ in defining intimate communities of 
Süryani-Keldani, in an effort to see the variances within the Süryani-Keldani 
community. However, my attempt to define such intimate communities is not intended 
to demonstrate the rifts within the community, but to outline the conditions that lead to 
misjudgment of others which in turn may hinder a wider engagement against inequality. 
I employ the concept of ‘model minority’ as articulated by race theorist Annalise Cheng 
in understanding the dynamics of the Süryani-Keldani in Istanbul. Cheng’s theory of 
racial melancholia of which ‘model minority’ is an instance also carries a component of 
jouissance which I believe is crucial in studying minorities outside the single lens of 
victimization by allowing for self-affirming modes of being. The concept of ‘model 
minority’ also allows me to analyze why and how subjectivities have shaped in certain 
ways, how discourses of recognition are subject to disciplining mechanisms of the state, 
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and how even seemingly liberating discourses of multiculturalism can function to create 
hierarchies of ethnic identity, and continue subordination, as articulated by Povinelli 
(Povinelli 2002). In the fourth chapter, I present a critique of multiculturalism as 
provided by theories of affect. 
 
This thesis arises out of the insight I gained in the para-ethnographic field in Rijssen, 
the Netherlands, in which I had a chance to discuss topics that people in Turkey 
carefully refrained from, also observe the very different understandings of ethnic 
identity. Even though the ethnography conducted in Rijssen is not extensive, it was 
central in shaping the arguments, the viewpoints and the objectives of this thesis. In the 
last chapter, I return to methodology briefly in order to point out further fields and 
modes of research that I see as necessary as a result of the ethnographic process of this 
thesis. I delve into the dynamics of para-ethnography and discuss how it has benefited 
this study, both through the redefinition of interlocutors as epistemic partners and the 
ensuing changed level of information transfer especially prominent in the diaspora, and 
also by confirming and necessitating further multi-sited research.
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2  HISTORY  
 
 
 
 
The Süryani-Keldani community in the diaspora, academicians and archivists are 
engaging in in-depth research in their efforts to compile a comprehensive 
documentation of the history of the Süryani-Keldani. University of Cambridge has a 
recently launched Modern Assyrian Research Archive (MARA)7. There is an effort to 
include Süryani-Keldani history in university programs. An overview of the history of 
the Süryani-Keldani community is necessary for my purposes, both as a participation in 
the effort to document, as well as in understanding the various subjectivities within the 
community that give rise to conflicting identifications of Süryani-Keldani, Assyrian, 
Süryani, Aramaic, Keldani, Assyrian-descent. Only through knowledge of Süryani-
Keldani history can we begin to understand the partial neglect of certain historical facts 
in people’s oral histories and their significance to the ethnographic analysis of 
subjectivity. A study of oral histories of Süryani-Keldani in Turkey reveals ambivalent 
discourses, that of an institutionalized state discourse versus discourse of a brutal local 
past as relayed by relatives and recent historical documentation (Neyzi 2008:107), thus 
constituting a challenge to the state discourse of national history. The dynamics that 
lead to ambivalences in the interpretation of the past are reflected by the numerous 
names used to depict the community, each portending a different negotiation of the past 
with the present. These ambivalences of naming do not only reflect the complex and 
contradictory nature of the past, but also reflect a history of assimilation and 
propagation of anti-Christian and anti-Jewish sentiments in late Ottoman Empire and 
the current republican era8, and therefore necessitate an analysis of the circumstances 
leading to the present context. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 http://assyrianarchive.org/home/ 
8 Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923. 
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The history of Süryani-Keldani is dazzlingly manifold. Lack of a nation-state and thus 
lack of an official history has resulted in the creation of multiple historical accounts that 
use different terminology, trace different interests, and often contradict each other. 
Keldani Catholic church, members of whom make up a big portion of this study, is a 
religion of eastern Christianity, and a part of Syriac Christianity that originated in the 
Antioch Church. A history of the Keldani Catholic church requires a recital of the 
history of the Süryani people, with whom they are ethnic kins and indeed share a 
common history until their ecclesiastic separation in 15th century. Even after the 
ecclesiastic separation people continued living under similar political and economic 
circumstances, albeit within the organization of different churches, in a region that was 
abutted against Persian and Ottoman empires, and later in the eastern provinces of the 
Ottoman Empire, leading up to the national independence war of Turkey, and events 
that succeeded the war.  
 
Even though currently Süryani-Keldani communities exist in Iraq, Iran, Syria, and 
Turkey, the population that makes up this ethnographic study shared similar fates as a 
result of their location as similarly marked ethnic subjects within the specific 
geographical and political location of late Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey. It is 
this shared history that leads to the acceptance of common unifying self-depictions, 
such as Assyrian or “model minority”. Hence, after a brief overview of the origins and 
early history of the churches of Süryani-Keldani with a specific focus on the 
constitution of the Keldani Catholic church, this historical account will focus on the 
histories of all the Süryani-Keldani who lived in eastern Anatolia and who remained 
within the borders of modern day Turkey after the independence war of 1923.  
 
 
 
2.1. Terminology 
 
 
Süryani is often used in Turkish language as an umbrella term for all the different 
Syriac churches, especially by the members of the Syriac Orthodox and Syriac Catholic 
churches. For example, when politician Erol Dora speaks for the whole Süryani-
Keldani community of Turkey at large, he uses the term “Süryani”. However, the term 
Süryani also stands specifically for the Syriac Orthodox Church (Süryani Ortodoks 
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Kilisesi, in Turkish), which is the basis on which Keldani prefer not be included under 
the term Süryani. Members of the Keldani church acknowledge its wide use due to the 
presence of a bigger number of members of the Syriac Orthodox church in Turkey, and 
do not mind being termed as “Süryani” even though they prefer to use the term 
“Keldani” or more specifically “members of the Keldani Catholic Church” in referring 
to themselves. This is the reason I opt to use the term “Süryani-Keldani”, instead of 
only “Süryani”, in speaking of the general ethnic community. Yildiz, a linguist 
specializing in the Süryani-Keldani languages, also claims that the most accurate way to 
refer to the community is Assyrian-Chaldean (Yildiz: 25). Similarly, albeit cautious of 
the fact that the word “Assyrian” carries potential political meanings which could lead 
to a misinterpretation of the dispositions of the communities in Turkey, and also on 
account of the fact that the word “Assyrian” does not occur in a majority of my 
fieldwork in Turkey, I will use the depiction “Süryani-Keldani” in referring to the 
community at large.  
 
The meanings and the etymology of the term Süryani, and hence the Süryani identity, 
are debated and current meanings vary, often reinterpreted according to the political 
stances of the communities9. Historically, a line of debate argues that Süryani-Keldani 
descended from Aramaens, Aramaic speaking people, Aramaic being the language of 
Jesus, thus designating a lingual and religious lineage to early Christianity and earlier. 
Another strong identification is attributed to the ancient Mesopotamian Empire of 
Assyria, thus delineating a racial lineage of Assyrians that persisted in the region after 
the Assyrian Empire fell. However, people started referring to themselves as Assyrian 
beginning in 19th century (Aktürk: 2). Bilge claims that the term Assyrian is also often 
used to refer to the community of Mesopotamia before Christianity, whereas Süryani is 
used to refer to the same community specifically during Christianity, and only to those 
who remained Christians. Others debate that Süryani-Keldani are an amalgamation of 
the people of upper Mesopotamia, a lineage of Assyrians, also including Babylonians 
and Aramaens, thus framing the discourse geographically. Süryani—as its often used in 
Turkey, or Assyrian—as is often used to refer to the community in Europe, and 
Süryani-Keldani—the depiction I employ for the community, thus describe a population 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 For more information on these debates, see Bilge, Y. p17; for information about 
various views on the constitution of terms such as Assyria or Suryoye, see Makko 2010 
or Rollinger 2006. 
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that belongs to the churches that originate in the region, such as the Syriac Orthodox 
church, Syriac Catholic church, Nestorian Church, Melkit church, Syriac Keldani 
Catholic church etc. Due to a lack of political leaders or a ruling dynasty, Süryani-
Keldani formed groups around ecclesiastical institutions (Yildiz: 22). This study does 
not attempt to challenge or settle the politics of naming and etymology, but only to 
acknowledge these differences in order to understand wider claims of identification that 
they portend. 
 
The word “Assyrian” is particularly used in claims of Süryani-Keldani nationalism. It is 
an attempt to justify and convey the community as an ethnic unity, which often gets 
obscured in the presence of numerous churches and religious identifications. It is meant 
to restore the unity of a community, and nourish a sense of unity in a community that 
has been divided through manipulations of churches and outside forces, in order to 
provide a solid foundation for future rights claims (Makko: 2). Usage of the term 
Assyrian therefore makes an ethnic claim that trumps all religious identification, and is 
specifically employed in the diaspora in European countries in expressing desires for 
cultural rights, ethnic unity, and possibly, a nation-state.  
 
The term “Assyrian”, as it appeared in documentation from 19th century, expressed 
desires of national unity, albeit with different meanings of what “national unity” 
entailed. National unity in 19th century, Makko argues, stands for a unity of millets, and 
thus is realizable under the regime of Ottoman Empire (Makko: 6, 15). However in its 
current usage, the term Assyrian is not only an ethnic claim, but also carries 
connotations of multiculturalism, and even national liberation. This is specifically why I 
find the term “Assyrian” unfit to describe the community in Turkey, and rather use the 
term Süryani-Keldani. Even though a sense of ethnic and religious community certainly 
exists among the Süryani-Keldani community in Turkey, their view of community is 
generally apolitical. They refer to themselves as “we” or “Süryani” or “Keldani”. None 
of these terms have the same ramifications as “Assyrian” does within the diaspora in 
European countries as represented by the community in Rijssen. Such a strong political 
claim is unexemplary of the Süryani-Keldani in Istanbul, for reasons that will become 
manifest in the next chapter. Usage of the word Assyrian in describing the community 
in Turkey, particularly in İstanbul, will do injustice to the political grounds of meaning 
that term has come to cover over 50 years of presence in certain European communities, 
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and will be an inaccurate representation of the generally apolitical population in 
Istanbul. On the other hand, my reluctance to use the term Assyrian does not entail that 
there is a complete lack of political activism in Turkey. In fact, there are forms of 
resistance to the curtailment of minority rights, epitomized by the election of Erol Dora. 
People are not disconnected from the diaspora or the present context of Kurdish rights 
claims in Turkey, and they have been inevitably affected by the intellectual 
developments that occurred among certain communities in Europe in the presence of 
increased liberties and rights. Often the term “Asurlu” is used to represent such 
politically bent thoughts.  
 
 
 
 
2.2. History 
 
 
Be it called Assyrian, Süryani, or Süryani-Keldani, terminologies of varying political 
views always refer to a distinct group of people with mythical ties to upper 
Mesopotamian culture that distinguishes itself ethnically from Arabs or Persians, and 
also distinguishes itself from those of similar descent who are no longer Christians, and 
yet it designates community that has inevitably been influenced greatly by the cultures 
around it. Aramaic became the dominant language of Assyrians10 early on, around 7th 
century BC. There were trade relations and probably an ethnic mixing with Aramaic 
speaking people, as a result of which Aramaic became widely used in upper 
Mesopotamia. Later when upper Mesopotamia was invaded by Muslim Arabs, Arabic 
culture became dominant among Süryani-Keldani. There is a common misconception in 
Turkey that Süryani-Keldani are Arab Christians. Even though it is inevitable that Arab 
blood has mingled with Süryani-Keldani blood, and certainly Arab culture and language 
is prevalent among some Süryani-Keldani, and despite the fact that some Süryani-
Keldani in Iraq refer to themselves as Christian Arabs11, people I met in my fieldwork 
do not designate themselves as Arabs. The church service, which is derived from the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 This identification is employed at this point in order to refer to the ethnic community 
prior to Christianity. Substitution of Assyrian at this point with Süryani-Keldani could 
omit those who speak Aramaic and did not convert to Christianity. 
11 In the case of Iraq, especially due to Arabization campaigns, some Süryani-Keldani 
have started calling themselves Arab Christians—either because of the years of 
interbreeding and/or also in order to maintain their safety. See Aktürk, Ş., p5 
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liturgy of the Antioch church, remains in a derivative of Aramaic12. In the Keldani 
Church in Istanbul, liturgy is in ancient Aramaic, and service is conducted mainly in 
Turkish; in another church where especially the refugees from Iraq attend, the service is 
conducted in modern Assyrian, “Suryoyo”.  
 
According to Bilge, Christianity was both a unifying force in the region of 
Mesopotamia, as well as a cultural determinacy for a community that had been under 
the influence of Hellenistic culture. Most of the pagan public converted to Christianity. 
The church records indicate that Apostle Thomas himself converted Assyrians to 
Christianity within a generation after the death of Christ (Travis: 327). They were 
speaking the language of Jesus, and it was easier for ideas of Christianity to spread in 
the region (Bilge: 47). This unifying force soon established institutional churches and 
became a method of voicing discontents towards Byzantine rule, and later the Süryani-
Keldani churches became a basis of religious separation from the Byzantine Empire. In 
fact, due to an absence of regional governance, the church, through its 
institutionalization, became politically and ideologically the most influential 
establishment in the region for Christians. Bilge makes a note of the fact that this 
region, never fully sovereign, has been the bumper zone between Byzantine and the 
Sassanid empires, and that the developments in the region, such as the separation of the 
numerous churches, must be understood not solely in terms of spiritual disagreements, 
but more importantly within the context of the political manipulation of the two 
empires, the struggle which later transformed to that between Ottomans and Sassanid 
Empire. 
 
With the beginning of Muslim invasions in 6th century, Arabs and Arab culture arrived 
in upper Mesopotamia. This was a period of religious suppression, and many people 
converted to Islam. Arab culture and language became dominant in the region. Bilge 
claims that Arab influence was prevalent in middle and southern-upper Mesopotamia, 
but that the mountainous north and northwestern regions were not affected, and 
continued using their own language. After the Muslim invasions, the region was ruled 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 For further information about the adoption of Aramaic as a formal language, refer to 
Yildiz 1999:19-20 
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by Selçuks, Mogols, and later Ottomans. Meanwhile, the church always had a spiritual 
and worldly leading influence in the lives of Süryani-Keldani. 
 
 
 
2.3. Ecclesiastic Divisions 
 
 
In this enclave between the distant and recent history of upper Mesopotamia, which 
brought about invasions, deportations, and migrations in the recent past that are still 
active in postmemories of many Süryani-Keldani, I would like to say a few words about 
the religious formations of the Süryani-Keldani Churches. Christianity arises out of 
Jerusalem. Nevertheless, as Jerusalem lost its influence through invasions (B.C. 70), the 
church in Antioch became powerful over other churches in the Middle East. There were 
two other main churches besides the Antioch Syriac church, Roman church and church 
of Alexandria. By the end of 3rd century, Antioch Syriac church was the administrative 
ruler of churches in Syria, Lebanon, Arab states, Palestine, Cilicia, Cappadocia, 
Mesopotamia and Iran (Bilge: 72). 
 
In the 3rd century, Constantine accepted Christianity as the religion of the Byzantine 
Empire. Shortly after religion became a governmental tool for the Byzantine and often a 
suppressive instrument used against the Middle Eastern churches. Religious and 
political disagreements arose between what the institutionalized Byzantine church 
decreed and the opinions of local churches. As Bilge points out, these religious 
disagreements mainly reflected regional politics in power struggle between Sassanid 
and Byzantine empires, in which religious disputes and clergy power struggles became 
political tools of manipulation, rather than debates about the dogmas of religion. After 
several councils with disavowals mainly of the Antioch Syriac church, finally in 5th 
century, upon the disavowal of Nestorianism (a branch of the Antioch church) as a 
heretic belief in the Khalkedon ecumenical council in 451, Antioch Syriac church broke 
off from the Byzantine church and became autonomous, thus giving rise to the realm of 
Western Christianity and Eastern Christianity, Antioch Church representing the 
Süryani-Keldani (Assyrian) Churches of Eastern Christianity.13 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 For further information about the accuracy of these ecclesiastic names, refer to Efrem 
Yildiz’s article, “The Assyrians: A Historical and Current Reality” 
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Nestorianism was a school of thought originating in the Antioch Church with Nestorius. 
After his education in Antioch, Nestorius became patriarch in Istanbul. He believed that 
God had both a spiritual and a worldly aspect, and that Jesus was born a man, but 
became God through baptism. He thus believed that Virgin Mary is not the mother of 
god, but mother of Jesus, and thus mother of man. This belief, also named diophysism, 
was a matter of contention in religious circles, and is stated as the basis of the 
separation of the Antioch Syriac church from Western Christianity, albeit separation is 
largely due to bigger political conflicts. Nestorians were not uniform in the diophsyite 
belief either. Nevertheless, Antioch Syriac became autonomous in its religious 
teachings in 451. As Syriac and Western churches divided as a result of the Khalkedon 
council in 451, further divides within Syriac church took place. The Süryani-Keldani 
were divided into the Syriac Orthodox Church which was Monophysite (aka Western 
Syriac Church), the Syriac Nestorian (aka Eastern Syriac Church) church, and the small 
group of Melkit church, which was a Syriac church that joined the Byzantine church. 
Further divides occurred within Syrian churches as a result of missionary activities by 
the western churches (Bilge: 66). 
 
In 1551, a group of the Syriac Nestorian church (also known as Eastern Syriac church) 
embraced Catholicism under Patriarch Yuhanna Sulaka. This group of Catholic 
Nestorians was named Keldani (Chaldean), after the ancient region of Babylon called 
Kalde (Chalde), Keldani meaning “the people of Kalde.” It is debated whether this 
particular group is actually from Kalde. An interlocutor relayed to me that he doubts 
whether there are any members of the Keldani church who are in fact from Kalde, and 
he does not think that it is possible to track it down. The prevalent view is that the 
Keldani are ethnic kins to the Süryani communities, and lived in just about the same 
region; however were Babylonians, not Assyrians. According to Özcoşar, starting in 
1551, the term Keldani is used to refer to a sect of Christianity, rather than an ethnic 
origin (Özçoşar: 272). This study does not wish to settle the debate in anyway, but it is 
important to state that regardless of the exact nature of kinship, even if there were 
ethnic difference between Süryani and Keldani, it would be accurate to state that both 
ethnicities have thoroughly interbred over hundreds of years, and the communities in 
Turkey have shared similar fates. 
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The union of Keldani Catholic Christians collapsed and reunited in 1672, 1771, 1778, 
and finally in 1830. In 1830, Babylon Patriarchy was formed and has existed until today 
as the patriarchy of the Keldani Catholic church. It is now in Baghdad. In addition to 
the patriarchy in Baghdad, there are four archbishops in Basra, Kirkuk, Sehna, Iran, and 
Urmiye, as well as 7 bishops Aleppo, Alkoş, Amadya, Akka, Beirut, Mosul and Zaho. 
There were other separations from the Nestorian church besides the Keldani Catholics. 
Some people joined the Monophysite Antioch Süryani Kadim patriarchy. And some 
Nestorians joined the Russian Orthodox Church. Thus the Keldani Catholic Church, 
(known as Chaldean Catholic Church in western literature) is part of the church of the 
east in communion with the see of Rome. The customs and the discipline of the Keldani 
have similarities to Latin rites, but Süryani liturgical tradition is retained. The Keldani 
liturgy is in a form of Aramaic as it was derived from the Jerusalem-Antioch liturgy.  
 
Near the end of 19th century, Süryani-Keldani lived in eastern Anatolia, the northern 
plateau of Mesopotamia, and northwestern Persia (Makko: 3), and the approximate 
population was 619,000 (Gaunt 2006:28) even though it is impossible to get at an 
accurate and unbiased census. The population that constitutes the population of this 
ethnographic study lived in eastern Anatolia, in the Ottoman vilayets of Aleppo, Bitlis, 
Diyarbakır (Omid/Āmid), Erzurum, Mamûretü’l-Azîz, Mosul, Sivas and Van (Makko: 
3). They lived in villages and towns and they had allegiances to difference ecclesiastic 
leaders. In order to settle a dispute between Nestorians and Keldani, it was decided by 
the Istanbul representative of the Keldani church in 19th century to let Keldani 
Christians to have Mardin and Diyarbakır, and Nestorians have Mosul and Aleppo, thus 
restoring peace (Albayrak: 112). We need to think of these regions not as sovereign 
lands, but rather as a concentration of villages, which were intermixed with other 
Christians like Armenians, as well as Kurds, Alevis, and Yezidis as well. 
 
 
 
2.4. Seyfo, Before and After 
 
 
The Keldani Catholic church was officially recognized by the Ottomans in 19th 
century in an attempt to exert control over Catholic churches (including the Armenian 
Catholic church and other Catholic churches), which were feared to be wielded by 
western countries. Catholic churches were recognized by the Ottomans as the Istanbul 
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Catholic Millet, which was later merged with the Armenian Millet. Thus, all the 
churches in it, including the Keldani church, had to recognize the patriarch of the 
Armenian Millet. Besides the patriarch in Istanbul, the Keldani Catholic Church was 
also in communion with the Pope through Baghdad, and a competition between the 
Ottoman Empire and the Pope continued over patriarch elections and priest 
organizations of the Keldani church (Özcoşar: 281). 
 
The Christians of the Ottoman empire were recognized under a system of protection 
and governance, himaye, recognized as believers as opposed to pagans, ehl-i kitap, and 
their lives were protected by the zimmet pact which required them to make regular 
payments to the empire, even though the specific nature of their rights and obligations 
varied from period to period (Gaunt: 37). The place of the Süryani-Keldani community 
within the religious establishment of Ottoman Empire millets was complex. The 
Süryani-Keldani were divided into separate millets, thus at times creating differences of 
treatment between members of Nestorian, Chaldean, and Süryani orthodox churches. 
Also, many were included in the Armenian millet and were subsumed into their 
numbers, and treated as Armenians until it was evident they were not Armenians. 
 
 In 19th century, after the invasion of Egypt, local Kurds realized the military weakness 
of Ottomans and some rebellious people garnered hopes of gaining independence or 
autonomy (Gaunt: 63). This forced the local Christian population to choose allies. 
Empowerment of religious Sheiks in the region caused the mainly political struggles to 
be plotted against religious divides (Gaunt: 65), which made it hard for some Christians 
to ally with the Kurds, and caused alienation of certain Kurdish groups from the 
government of Jeune Turks. In a desire to sustain unity, Ottoman Empire engaged in a 
series of local military organizations in eastern Turkey. These military establishments, 
Hamidiye regiments, organized under the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, were spread out 
throughout the area, mainly consisting of Kurds, and they were enticed into jihad, 
provoked by the cooperation of some Christians with the invading Europeans or 
Russians. (Gaunt: 68)  Their main duty was to ensure the protection of border areas. 
Hamidiye regiments were far from professional—often times they would refuse to fight, 
and sometimes they would raid Christian villages to gain the payments the empire had 
failed to make. As certain officials and members of the populations attacked Christians, 
others protected their lives (Gaunt: 77). There were differences of opinion between the 
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Süryani-Keldani community under different leaders and living in different cities. 
Whereas certain cities and groups of Süryani-Keldani declared loyalty to the Ottoman 
Empire in early 20th century, people in other cities acted differently as demonstrated by 
the participation of Süryani-Keldani to certain Kurdish uprisings against the centralized 
rule of Jeune Turk government in 1913 (Gaunt: 70), or as demonstrated by Patriarch 
İlyas Şakir’s communication to the Süryani-Keldani in Urfa in which he expresses his 
disapproval for their decision to ally with the French (Akyüz:445). Often times people’s 
acts of self-defense in the presence of brutalities were also interpreted as “rebellion” 
and used to justify the massacres.  
 
Ottoman Empire had regional land disputes with Russia in Caucasia, Persia in its 
eastern borders, and British forces in northern Mesopotamia; Süryani-Keldani became a 
buffer zone for most of the clashes and disagreements between these empires. In order 
to justify the massacre of Christian populations, public opinion had to be led to believe 
that Christians were allying with foreign powers, even though the foreign powers would 
change—Russians, French or British. It was the aggravation of Muslim and Christian 
relations that prepared the environment and public opinion in favor of genocide (Gaunt: 
79).  
 
Süryani-Keldani suffered their biggest loss during WW1. They shared the fate of 
Armenians. Often they were killed on the spot in their villages instead of being 
deported.14 Still, differences of opinion permeated the region. Patriarch Mar Şimun 
promised their allegiance to the Ottoman Empire to the governor of Van. However, a 
group of Süryani-Keldani in the east fought back as a result of increased violence and 
massacres in the area, which was then considered a rebellion by the ground forces. 
Baum and Winkler claim that upon hearing the news of Süryani-Keldani massacres in 
the northwest, the patriarch officially declared war on Turkey in the name of his Millet 
on May 10, 1915, hoping for support from the Russians (Baum&Winkler: 137). 
Thousands were killed. People were killed regardless of whether they had pledged their 
allegiance to the Ottomans or not, as a result of systematic massacres conducted by the 
Ottoman Empire against Christians. Many of them ran away to Iran or sought refuge in 
Russian territories (Bilge: 113). Even the Süryani-Keldani that never cooperated with 
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14David Gaunt’s presentation in Innanna Foundation Conference 2011. 
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foreign powers and claimed allegiance to the Ottoman Empire and who prayed in favor 
of the Ottoman sultan and supported the Ottoman Empire were massacred. Due to lack 
of a nation-state, Süryani-Keldani were fragmented, and they had many religious 
leaders and political stances. Groups of Süryani-Keldani even belonged to different 
millets, therefore at times they were treated differently by the authorities and at times 
they acted differently. Nevertheless, insurgents, allies, civilians, women, and youth 
alike were brutally massacred by the Hamidiye regiments starting in late 19th century, 
and most intensely in 1915. These massacres are also known as Seyfo, the Suryoyo 
word for “sword” which refers for the genocide, but rarely occurs in oral accounts of 
Süryani-Keldani in Turkey as there is both a lack of knowledge and transmission, as 
well as fear around its pronunciation. Generally there is an inclination to draw ties to 
the peacefully existing loyal Süryani-Keldani who never aggravated the state and were 
not killed in the thousands, as often happens in the discourse of model minority.  
 
Although a detailed study is beyond the scope of this paper, an analysis of the formation 
of public opinion around Christian and Jewish identities is due in order to explicate the 
reasons leading to institutionalized and public racism against Christians. Initial notions 
of “non-Muslim15” in early republican Turkey occur and shape over the ownership of 
capital. Many Christians were traders and businessmen, lived in town centers and 
owned economic capital. Economic motives and market interests of a newly formed 
government lay behind the confiscation of Christian owned properties and businesses 
(Keyder: 95)16, leading to the Christian massacres of 1915. Üngör cites an instance of 
the confiscation of the silk factory owned by the Tirpandjian family, which employed 
dozens of Armenians and Süryani-Keldani. In 1915, the owner and employees were 
killed, and the factory was confiscated by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), 
the only political party, and allotted to local CUP member Müftüzade Hüseyin 
(Üngör:25). Transfer of wealth and property continued through the republic of Turkey. 
The notorious Varlık Tax in 1942 specifically intended to impoverish Christians and 
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15 Christian and Jewish subjects of the nation are often referred to as “gayrimüslim”, 
which translates as “non-Muslim.” However, since such a depiction assumes “Muslim” 
as the norm, I prefer to refer to the so-called population as “Christians and Jews”. For 
the sake of ease of reading, and since this paper specifically examines a particular 
Christian community, I will use “Christian” instead of “Christians and Jews”. 
16 “Geleneksel yönetici sınıf ile bu sınıfı tehdit eden burjuvazi arasındaki mücadele 
ideolojik olarak etnik ve dinsel çatışma alanına kaydırıldı” 
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Jews (Yumul 2005:88). Christians and Jews were taxed ten times more than Muslims 
and they were banished to work camps if they could not pay the preemptory  amounts. 
Şükrü Saracoğlu, the prime minister of the republic of Turkey at the time of Varlık Tax 
claimed, “...this law is a revolution. This is a chance to regain control of our economy. 
We will hence eliminate the foreigners that dominate our market, and give the Turkish 
economy to Turks”17 thus publicly designating Christians as foreigners and non-Turkish 
and inciting people to violence against Christians and Jews. Christian businesses were 
raided in 1955. Widespread assassinations occurred in Christian regions following the 
derogatory representation of Rums in the media during conflicts in Cyprus, which lead 
to massive migration. As an interlocutor said, “my father ordered my brothers to ‘take 
your family and leave’”. Economic desire to centralize profits went hand in hand with 
the constitution of Christians as “enemy within” in order to justify the government’s 
unjust actions to the public. Thus posing of the Christian as “enemy within” itself is a 
discourse that constitutes the government and its main citizenry as primarily Muslim. 
The fear of “enemy within” and the fear mongering around Christian identity became so 
operative, enabling, and exonerating that with the aid of other discourse producing 
organs of the state—history telling, media and other nationalist organizations—
Christians were constituted and perceived as a danger to the state, therefore disguising 
the economic motives behind their constitution as such. As the economic bases of such 
policies intended to consolidate capital and power were concealed behind portrayal of 
Christians as “enemy within”, perception of Christians as “enemy within” and ensuing 
racism became normalized.  
 
 
 
2.5. Ambiguities 
 
 
A historically discriminatory narrative inevitably has implications in daily life. 
Christians encounter rampant racism throughout their lives. As children they get called 
names at school, and most people have vivid accounts of being hurt as children. Later 
on in life they get called derogatory names, such as aliens and infidels. Given such a 
discriminatory history and present, how can one account for deliberate mis-
interpretations of the past that I often witnessed while doing fieldwork, such as the 
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17Relayed by A. Aktar, Varlık Vergisi:148 
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denial or insignificance of Seyfo—the Assyrian word referring to the genocide of 
1915—or a refusal of minority rights as guaranteed by Lausanne treaty? There is 
rampant misinterpretation among academicians and public alike that only Jewish, Rum 
and Armenian communities were accorded minority rights18 by Lausanne treaty in 
1923. In fact, legally speaking, all religious minorities are entitled to minority rights 
(Oran 2004:67); however the government has been denying de facto realization of 
minority rights to the Süryani-Keldani community. Despite the numerous articles and 
books that Oran published regarding the rights of Süryani-Keldani, why does a 
particular part of the community continue to take pride out of denying minority rights in 
Lausanne? 
 
Political theorist Montag offers the concept of “ghosts” in understanding how and why 
such different dispositions happen and get propagated, resulting in the formation of 
intimate communities. According to Montag, ghosts are weighted and nuanced 
accumulations and residues of past and present experiences that determine the 
possibility of action or inaction, and the structure of desire in the present (Montag: 77). 
They are forces that people are unconscious of, yet those that affect the way they 
behave by structuring apprehensions and desires. Affective interpretations of the past 
are inevitably conditioned by institutional dynamics and conditions of the present. For 
example, presence in an environment where Christians are easily accused of being 
“traitors of the state” can necessitate a reiteration of the nationalist discourse, leading to 
the interpretation of massacres of 1915 as necessary retaliation in the context of the war 
of independence, an inclination to draw ties to the peaceful and loyal Süryani-Keldani 
of early 20th century, or a denial of such a bloody history altogether.  
 
However, knowledge of the injustices exists in forms of post-memory, in family 
histories, and books, looming, disrupting, and requiring re-interpretations of the past, 
thus intermittently challenging the linear temporality of the nationalist discourse. As 
Neyzi demonstrates through the local knowledge of the history of Izmir/Smyrna, such 
knowledge and its vocalization in the form of memories are inevitably acts of resistance 
because they grind against the nationalist discourse (Neyzi 2008:124). Existence of both 
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18 For an analysis of the rights accorded to Christian and Jewish communities, refer to 
Oran 2004. 
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the nationalist discourse as well as a version of the past as relayed through family, 
memory, books, and diaspora can create an ambiguity in the subject, giving rise to 
varying interpretations and mis-interpretations of the past. Such ambiguity can be talked 
about through the metaphor of “ghosts”, that is forces that loom and haunt people 
occasionally, challenging and contradicting one’s understanding of reality. There is a 
ghost of the millet system that either begets a tumultuous existence or a peaceful history 
of coexistence of Muslim and Christian; there is a ghost of the invasions of Anatolia by 
Europeans in late 19th and early 20th century that necessitates either an 
acknowledgement of brutalities, constructed ties to the “loyal” Süryani-Keldani that 
never rebelled against the state, or an adoption of the rhetoric of nationalist justification; 
there is a ghost of ancient Assyria that creates a sense of ethnic community albeit with 
varying views of community; there is a ghost of language that either is a contribution to 
the cultural mosaic of Turkey, or cause of bitterness for being neglected, undervalued, 
or assimilated. These historical facts have a ghostly presence as they create ambiguities 
and contradictions in the subject. Different interpretations of the past are influenced by 
the present, and influence the way life, meaning, and action is conceived as it unfolds in 
the present, thus forming intimate communities of feeling. Knowledge of ghosts enable 
and account for diverse interpretations, allegiances, or stakes in past events, and 
particular interpretations of what it means to be a Süryani-Keldani. 
 
Concept of ghosts is also useful because it helps to dissect the unconscious meanings 
behind actions or inactions. How should the silence about genocide of the Süryani-
Keldani community in İstanbul be interpreted? It could be interpreted straightforwardly 
as ‘assimilation’ but ghosts help to interpret this silence as due to ensuing fear of 
genocide, uncertainty about future safety, lack of minority rights, and dynamics of 
being a model minority. If we did not have the concept of thinking about ghosts that 
loom from the past and influence possibilities of action and inaction, the silence and 
contradiction in the Süryani-Keldani community in İstanbul could simply be understood 
as assimilation, therefore disguising the sense of fear, oppression, lack of future 
protection, hierarchies within minority communities, and an insecurity about possible 
reverberations of an active Süryani-Keldani politics brewing in the diaspora that could 
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create nationalist and religious backlashes in Turkey. Similarly, centrality of 191519 to 
conversations about the community in the diaspora can easily be misinterpreted as 
identity politics—thus disguising the motivation for persistent migration and 
inequalities that people had to endure even after the genocide, such as starvation, 
imprisonments, murders, impoverishments, banishments and arrests (Beth-Şawoce & 
Bar Abraham: 23)20, assimilatory procedures, as well as alienation experienced 
abroad.21  
 
 
 
2.6. Hrant Dink and To-day 
 
 
On January 19, 2007, Hrant Dink, journalist and editor-in-chief of the Armenian-
Turkish newspaper Agos, was assasinated in front of his office in Şişli, İstanbul. About 
100,000 thousand people joined Dink’s funeral. The court case is closed as of January 
17, 2012, and despite the ample evidence of a plotting scheme, the court has failed to 
pronounce the conspiracy as a terrorist act, a charge otherwise easily attributed, such as 
often is done in response to student demonstrations. The plotters have not been 
completely identified, hitmen’s sentences are shortened, the government, army and 
police officials who are guilty of both encouraging the assasination and failing to 
prevent it have either been not brought to court, excuplated, or at most penalized with 6 
months of jailtime22. Meanwhile, the tape records of the crime scene have mysteriously 
disappeared, other evidence such as phone records that might lead to the identification 
of plotters have either been barred from disclosure or disregarded by the court, key 
people were not investigated, and ensuing threats against Armenians have been 
condoned, evidencing the multifarious attempts to obfuscate evidence, obscure the 
identification of the networks plotting Dink’s assasination, and failure to pronounce the 
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19 1915 is the year of the most brutal Christian massacres in Anatolia. The word “1915” 
is used to refer to the genocide.  
20 Jan Beth-Şawoce and Abdulmesih Bar Abraham’s coauthored article gives very 
detailed and referenced account of the distresses suffered by Süryani-Keldani 
population after the genocide and in the period of Republic of Turkey. It supports its 
arguments through oral histories and governmental records. 
21 A man in the diaspora conveyed feelings of constant estrangement, not being able to 
fully belong to Europe or Turkey. 
22 http://www.hranticinadaleticin.com/tr/kronoloji.php 
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plot as an act of terror, which has significantly mitigated the penalty. The failure of the 
legal process to penalize the necessary actors signifies a wider condoning of an 
Armenian’s murder on the ground that he continues to be an “enemy within”.  
 
However, as I mentioned earlier, the assassination of Hrant Dink and the debates that 
followed his death have altered the way minorities and minority rights are talked about 
and viewed within the public sphere. Since Hrant Dink’s death, Armenians have started 
speaking about the genocide openly, and even the wider public sphere has engaged in 
these conversations to certain extents. Meanwhile, it is also the case that such 
vocalizations of past and present injustices have created backlashes in the form of 
publicly made racist and anti-Armenian remarks that have also increased in number 
(interview with Yumul, 2010)23.  Death of Hrant Dink and Kurdish right activisms have 
provided the context for the dynamics within the Süryani-Keldani communities. 
 
This chapter aimed at informing the readers both about the relatively unknown history 
of the Süryani-Keldani, as well as providing information about the context in which 
ethnography was conducted. In the next chapter, I offer ethnography of the Süryani-
Keldani population in Istanbul by drawing certain contrasts from the community in 
Europe as represented by the sample community in Rijssen. In the next chapter I also 
expand on the concepts of “model minority” and “intimate community” that I briefly 
introduced in this chapter. Both concepts inevitably portend a restricted knowledge or 
awareness of the history explicated in this chapter. In the next chapter I attempt to 
situate the reasons underlying the specific modes of interpretations of this history in 
forms of partial recognition and partial remittance, as well as demonstrate the ways in 
which knowledge of history changes as a result of the circumstances of the present.  
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23!Taraf, Tuğba Tekerek’s interview with Arus Yumul, “Arus Yumul: Hrant Şato’daki K’ydı”, 
01.17.2010!
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3  CONTESTATIONS OF ETHNICITY 
 
 
 
 
Erol Dora was elected a member of the parliament on June 12, 2011, being the first 
Keldani-Süryani politician ever to be represented in the parliament of Turkey. His 
election was newsworthy both because it was a tale of victory that seemed to prove the 
multicultural status of Turkey, as well as a poignant tale of the newfound success of an 
afflicted and underprivileged minority. The following moment occurred in the TV 
program İlk Süryani Aday Söz Sende, on Habertürk, a popular Turkish news channel:  
 
Reporter24: Why was <becoming a member of the parliament > utopic? Is 
that because you are a Süryani?  
 
Dora25: [No, definitely not] I mean of course.... how shall I say (a lump 
forms in his throat, and he swallows hard) that might have to do with it too, 
and secondly there is the issue of getting votes. 26 
 
Confronted with what the reporter deemed belonged to him, a victimized Süryani-
Keldani identity that despairs for political representation and cannot get it due to his 
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24 Pamir, Balçiçek (reporter); Dora, Erol (guest). İlk Süryani aday Söz 
Sende. Habertürk, Date of publication: 22 April 2011. 
http://video.haberturk.com/haber/video/ilk-suryani-aday-soz-sendede/50109. Retrieved 
on 2011. 
25 A Süryani-Keldani nominated to be a part of the Parliament through independent 
parties. On June 12, 2011 he got elected and thus is the first representative of the 
Süryani-Keldani community in the parliament of Turkey. Erol Dora is an independent 
candidate supported by the Emek, Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Platform, and will join the 
leadership of BDP once parliament convenes, as stated in his interview on news channel 
NTV (CITE: http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25222948/) 
26 Interaction in its original language, Turkish, is a follows:  
Reporter: Neden <milletvekili olmak> utopikti? Süryani oldugunuz icin mi? 
Dora: [Yook yook] yani şimdi tabi ki...yani mesela diyelim (lump in the throat, 
swallows hard) onun da etkisi olabilir, ikincisi bir de oy olayı vardır.  
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identity as a Süryani-Keldani, Dora faltered. A lump formed in his throat. At once Dora 
denied that such a victimized and pitied identity existed “No, definitely not,” soon after 
he conceded, “that might have to do with it too”. While wary of making the lump do 
more symbolic work than it carries, I nonetheless suggest that the lump is an affective 
moment that may be potentially seen as bearing with it traces of the dynamics that give 
rise to both a denial and acceptance of subordination, hence evoking conflicting 
dispositions of what it means to be a Süryani-Keldani in Turkey.  
 
The study of affect and affective moments is as much about pauses, silences, and lumps 
as it is about discourse.  Ngai theorizes a lump in the throat as standing for a whole 
range of undischarged emotions (Ngai: 92).  The instant refusal, the ensuing lump, and 
the following half-hearted affirmation of Dora need not be overlooked as simply a slip-
of-the-tongue or stage fright, but in fact can be viewed as a potent moment to be 
analyzed. The lump is a physical reaction against categorization as a victimized 
Süryani-Keldani, as well as a physical reaction to being portrayed as a completely 
untroubled and self-conscious member of a contained, static, and total ethnic 
community, and all the dynamics that lie in between. This chapter explores the 
institutional, political and psychical factors that create contestations over what it means 
to be a Süryani-Keldani subject. 
 
Eng&Han employ the term “racialized melancholia” in order to refer to a certain lack 
that can occur in a minority subject as a result of her inability to fully become an 
unmarked citizen of the majority population due to discrimination; a racialization that is 
“melancholic” because it becomes a central engagement in life (Eng&Han: 363). 
Realizing the inadequacy of the term “racialized” in describing modes of 
discrimination, I use it with caution and extend its meaning to rather that of “marked” 
belonging, since such melancholia can and does occur in other modes of economic, 
ideological, or gendered existences. In the case of the Süryani-Keldani community in 
Istanbul, a small Christian minority group of merely 25,000 people in a nation that is 
predominantly Muslim, veritably a community that has been subjected to mass 
genocide in early 20th century and ongoing displacements, denigration, confiscations, 
and legal despotisms due to religion, Christianity often becomes the inassimilable 
property around which racialized melancholia forms. Most people have vivid memories 
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of confrontation with their Christian identities at school and in other social 
environments.  
 
This chapter demonstrates the processes that lead to the creation of Süryani-Keldani 
identities through examining the particular dynamics of “model minority” as racial 
melancholia, and the moments in which the dynamics of model minority ceases to 
function for particular communities. I attempt to enhance understanding of the 
complexity of this ethnic group by charting particular life circumstances that lead to 
conflicting dispositions about what it means to be a proper ethnic subject, and offer a 
critique of multiculturalism through affect theory. These conflicting dispositions 
became vocalized in the juncture of Dora’s public demands for multicultural rights. 
 
 
 
3.1 Conflicting Communities 
 
 
In an interview27 on NTV, another popular news channel, Erol Dora speaks about the 
discriminations that the Süryani-Keldani experience, talking on behalf of the 
community in Mardin by whose votes he was elected. He speaks about the legal 
complications of the Süryani-Keldani, such as the lawsuit that assaults the territorial 
integrity of Mor Gabriel, an ancient Christian monastery built in 397. Dora mentions 
discontent about hindrances towards learning and teaching in native language, and 
laments about lack of access to minority rights that were accorded to the Süryani-
Keldani community by Lausanne treaty. These concerns collide with dispositions of a 
part of the community who pitch their lives as unproblematic. This section tackles the 
formation of these two conflicting communities in the context of the Süryani-Keldani 
community in Istanbul.  
 
A person from the Süryani-Keldani community responded to Dora’s interview with a 
letter, which was published in Yalçın Bayer’s column28 in Hürriyet, one of the 
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27 Interview with Erol Dora on NTV, June 14, 2011. Retrieved 08.18.2011. 
http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25222948/ 
28 On 06/23/2011, Yalcin Bayer relayed an anonymous letter from Sweden. The 
excerpts have been taken from this letter. 
(www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/18090474.asp). On 06/25/2011, Yalcin Bayer also 
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mainstream newspapers, without any comments. The letter is titled, “Erol Dora is not 
our representative”29 and it reflects the concerns of an intimate community of Süryani-
Keldani in response to Erol Dora’s remarks on NTV about the need for increased 
minority rights. 
 
    He says ‘Süryani community has been living here for 6500 years; they 
are natives to this land. And they have problems.’ But the Catholic Keldani 
and Orthodox Süryani communities belong to different churches. One 
doesn’t know the other. We do not have anything to do with certain 
individuals.30  
 
The author wants to distinguish his community from the community that Dora 
represents, by pointing to ecclesiastic distinctions. Repudiation of Dora’s representative 
power as a member of the parliament through a stress on denominational distinctions 
and ensuing public rejection of his cause, aims to refute Dora’s claim that Süryani-
Keldani community has problems. It also reflects the fear that increased minority rights 
claims will cause frictions with the government. “This will cause Süryani to be 
affronted by the government in many circumstances”31. The author fears that a rights-
seeking Süryani-Keldani image might cause increased attention and scorn, which might 
result in the retraction of certain securities the community has secured through being 
model minority subjects of the nation. This behavior is exemplary of the rhetoric of 
“model minority”, which describes a situation in which a group denies its modes and 
history of discrimination, and purports to be exemplary citizens of a nation. 
 
Another member of the Süryani-Keldani community responded to the anonymous letter 
with another letter. Jan Bartuma32, born in Turkey and now living in Sweden, blamed 
the anonymous author in Bayer’s column for being assimilated, “Nobody would want to 
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included in his column the response of the Mezopotamya Kultur ve Dayanisma Dernegi 
in his column .(www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/18106710.asp) Both the letter and the 
response were published in his column without any comments. 
29 “Erol Dora bizim vekilimiz değil” 
30 “Süryaniler bu bölgede 6500 yıllık tarihleri olan yerli bir halktır. Dolayısıyla onların 
da sıkıntıları var’ diye konuşuyor. Oysa, Katolik Keldaniler ve Ortodoks Süryaniler ayrı 
kiliselere bağlıdır. Kimin ne olduğu bilinmez. Bizim şahıslarla ilgimiz olamaz.” 
31 “Süryanileri her platformda devletle karşı karşıya getirecek” 
32 Names of people have been changed in order to ensure people’s privacy. 
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represent people who doubt their Süryani identity,”33 hence criticizing the anonymous 
author for impeding on the community’s access to minority rights, which he deems is 
essential for the sustenance of a proper Süryani-Keldani identity and for overcoming 
inequality.  
 
The disagreements, denunciations, allegations and loyalties that are established by these 
letters demonstrate the variances and ambivalences within this community, which 
became manifest in the form of a lump in Dora’s throat. In this chapter I attempt to 
elucidate the conditions that lead to these ambivalences. As mentioned in the last 
chapter, there is disagreement even about the proper ways of self-referral. Whether 
“Süryani” “Keldani” “Süryani-Keldani” “Asurlu” “Assyrian” or “Aramaic” needs to be 
employed in referring to the community is a matter of contention and portends different 
world views regarding how one conceives of her ethnicity, her rights, her present 
conditions and her past. Furthermore, there are disagreements about what it means to be 
a “minority”; some people desire minority rights, like those whom Dora represents, 
whereas others deny that such a need exists, and others, like the anonymous reviewer, 
loath the idea. These feelings are inevitably related with the contradictory and varying 
interpretations of history, such as whether patriarch İlyas Şakir denounced minority 
status in Lausanne conference out of his accord as an act of loyalty to the state, as one 
interlocutor proudly explains, or whether patriarch İlyas Şakir signed off minority rights 
through manipulation, threat, or financial outcome, as another interlocutor asserts. 
There are disagreements about genocide; some people define and understand their 
displaced existence through genocide, while others deny that it ever took place, and 
there are others who claim that it did not affect them, therefore they need not be 
concerned about genocide.  
 
These disagreements reflect the wide range of feelings within the community that are 
based on particular interpretations of history, structural inequalities and pressures, 
defined by class, displacement and current conditions of presence, what I call the 
historical present. Even though there is certainly a sense of a wider ethnic community 
that evades such disagreements, particular interpretations of the past and present define 
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33 “Süryaniliklerinden şüphe edilen bu insanları ne Erol Dora nede başkası temsil etmek 
istemez.” 
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specific sensitivities, and form “intimate communities”. These communities are 
“intimate”, because there are visceral things that lead to such sensitivities, such as 
institutional restraints, fear, and what I have been referring to as the ghostly presence of 
history, which lead to particular interpretations of the past that poise minds and bodies 
differently, resulting in specific forms of racialized melancholia in which the self 
becomes invested (Aretxaga: 182). In the case of the intimate communities of Süryani-
Keldani in İstanbul, racialized melancholia has given rise to the complicated dynamics 
of model minority. Racialized melancholia has also allowed for political organization 
around rights claims, and it has compelled people to escape through migration. In the 
following part, I describe the institutional and psychological factors that lead to the 
creation of particular intimate communities of racialized melancholia through an 
affective ethnography, focusing primarily on those who live in İstanbul, but with 
occasional and less comprehensive references to those in diaspora and Mardin.  
 
 
 
3.2 Dynamics of Model Minority 
 
 
The ethnographic material I present in this thesis revolves around two intimate 
communities within the Keldani Church community in Istanbul that can briefly, albeit 
inadequately, be described by the following remarks:  
 
Zekiye: “the only difference between you and me is that I go to church on 
Sundays” 34  
 
Nathali: “I am not Turkish… It would be nice to live with my own 
people35” 
 
These views reflect major differences regarding people’s orientation toward the state, 
their sense of belonging and inclusion, which inevitably arise out of various 
interpretations of the past in purview of the conditions of the present, caused by what I 
have been referring to as the ghostly presence of history. These two intimate 
communities should be regarded as a continuum of affective community, rather than 
mutually exclusive categories.  
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34 “Senle benim tek farkım ben Pazar günleri kiliseye gidiyorum.” 
35 “Kendi milletimin insanlarıyla birlikte olmak belki daha iyi olurdu.” 
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Tangential with Parla’s claims of the importance of class in accessing social citizenship 
(Parla 2011a:457), a sense of belonging and inclusion is aligned with economic and 
social capital, as increasing wealth is an indicator of increased engagement with the 
political economic system of Turkey. Zekiye is an example to this group. Her family 
migrated to Istanbul in the 1970s from the city of Mardin. She works for a family 
business, travels abroad, joins social clubs that are socially selective and costly. She 
sends her kids to private schools, and buys the latest playstation games.  
 
Nathali, on the other hand, is a young adult. Her family moved to İstanbul when she 
was a toddler, in early 1990s. Her native language is Suryoyo, the ethnic language of 
Süryani-Keldani. She lives in a poorer area of Istanbul, and has attended public schools. 
Her parents have heavy accents, and are poor due to loss of property and livelihood—
livestock and gardens—caused by recent deportation from their village. She feels 
alienated from the majority, and equates “Turk” with “Muslim”. Nearly all her relatives 
live abroad, and she wants to go abroad as well. Even though social and economic 
classes have a big role in her feelings of alienation from the community, they are not 
the only factors that make her doubt her belonging. Kymlicka, a political scientist 
known for his work on multiculturalism, claims that providing material benefits to a 
community, whose structure of feeling is represented by Nathali, will not necessarily 
ensure its integration into the common culture or make people first class social citizens 
(Kymlicka:173). This results from the fact that most institutions are implicitly geared 
towards the interests of majority groups, therefore creating burdens and barriers for 
members of minority groups (Kymlicka & Norman: 4), hence necessitating group-
differentiated rights for increased equality. 
 
 
 
3.2.1. “We are just like you”  
 
 
Zekiye represents a group of Süryani-Keldani who mainly migrated from the cities of 
Mardin and Diyarbakır. They comprise the wealthier part of the population, who were 
and are still traders or business owners. Many moved abroad to Europe, Americas, and 
Australia, but those who moved to Istanbul arrived in the 70s. People in Rijssen often 
remarked about the wealth and shrewdness of this community for “having their eyes 
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open” and moving to İstanbul to open businesses. Most members of this community do 
not speak Suryoyo. People are business owners, jewelers or textile manufacturers. Some 
people disapprove of minorities who seek minority rights, and describe the claims for 
minority rights as “cheating the government”, whereas others claim that they do not 
need these rights.   
 
   “I am a Turk. We are children of this land. We are citizens of Turkey. 
Hence we did not deem the title of minority as appropriate, they didn’t at the 
time, and if you ask me, I do not think it is an appropriate title either. 
Because I am a Turk. I live in Turkey. And I will ask to be referred to as 
minority? It seems senseless. Then what am I doing in Turkey? You want a 
special status, so you ask for minority rights. I think it is ridiculous36”  
 
Members of this group have adopted a much stronger identification with the 
mainstream constructed Turkish identity, and are reluctant to see themselves as 
outsiders to this identity. This does not mean that they do not struggle for inclusion. 
People often allude to the fact that they pay taxes and serve in the army, which is an 
effort to prove citizenship.  
 
   “We have been living in Turkey for about 200-300 years. We have come 
to embody Turkish traditions and beliefs. We are citizens of Turkey. We 
live just like Turkish citizens, and we have the same needs and obligations 
as all citizens of Turkey. Does a Turkish male serve in the army? We also 
serve in the army. If there is a war, god forbid, we join the armed forces.”37 
 
Marshall offered one of the first theorization of citizenship by defining citizenship as 
constituting of political rights, civic rights and social rights (Marshall 1964). However, 
the presence of rights does not necessarily entail that they are practiced equally. 
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36 “Ben Turk’um. Biz bu topraklarin cocuklariyiz. Turkiye cumhuriyeti vatandasiyiz. 
Dolayisiyla biz azinligi yani uygun gormedik, gormediler ki, ben de aslinda su anda 
bana sorarsaniz ben de uygun gormuyorum. Cunku ben turk’um. Turkiyede yasiyorum. 
Azinlik diye birsey mi isticem? Bana cok manasiz geliyor. O zaman ben turkiyede ne 
isim var... hem de azinlik ikinci bir kategoride gormek icin kendinize baska birsey 
istiyorsunuz. Bana bu cok sacma geliyor” 
37!“200-300 senedir türkiye’de yaşantısı sözkonusu ve bu yaşantı içerisinde türk örf ve 
anenilerini benimseyerek yaşamışlar, türkiye vatandaşıdır, türkiye vatandaşının bütün 
ne ihtiyacı varsa, ne nasıl yaşanması gerkeiyorsa onu yaşıyor. yani bir türk vatandaşı 
erkek çocuk olarak askere mi gitmesi gerekiyor, askere gidiyor. Allah korusun savaş mı 
oluyor savaşa katılıyor.” 
!
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Additionally, viewing citizenship solely in terms of equality in rights fails to account 
for the inherent assumptions in the law itself. Paul Silverstein made an intervention to 
the concept of citizenship by introducing the concept of citizenship as a “surveilled 
performance”, thus moving the debate away from a possession of the formal, civic, and 
social rights to observing differences in practice of daily life, which reflected 
institutional biases of the state. “Citizenship, when viewed as a social practice rather 
than as a set of formal rights and duties, emerges out of a set of embodied (and often 
linguistic) performances.” (Silverstein 2008:25) Certain people are expected to perform 
their loyalty to the state more than formal citizens are expected to do so (Silverstein 
2008:29), which creates a marked citizenship. The struggle of this intimate community 
to include itself within the majority dominant group through underlining cultural or 
economic practices that signify good citizenship makes them marked citizens who are 
expected to perform their citizenship, unlike others whose citizenships are taken for 
granted. People often claim “we pay our taxes; our sons do their military service duties. 
We are just like you.38” The need for such an assurance itself indicates that certainty 
about their full citizenship is lacking.  
 
Zekiye’s remark also signifies an attempt made by the community to cast religion to a 
personal realm, which is another method of proving one’s inclusion in a secular 
dominant society as religion-less secular subjects. However, Islam remains a central 
tenet of the Turkish government and definition of what it means to be “Turkish”, hence 
belying the secular imaginings of citizenship in Turkey.  Furthermore, centrality of 
religion to the lives of many Süryani-Keldani belies such decentralization. Church 
service occupies a very distinct place among the community in Istanbul. Youth attends 
Bible classes on weekends, which is also one of the ways Christians socialize. There are 
young people who attend church at least monthly. “I feel like I have sinned if I do not 
attend church on a Sunday”39 says a teenager. Groups of women gather biweekly for 
special prayers specific to women. Women are actively involved in the upkeep of 
churches.  
 
   “Recently the vicar of the Patriarch came here to sanctify our new priest. 
He stayed about a week, 3 or 4 days. We looked after him during the whole 
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38 “Vergimizi ödüyoruz, oğlumuzu askere gönderiyoruz. Yani sizinle aynıyız.” 
39 “ bir Pazar kiliseye gitmiyim sanki suç işlemişim gibi hissediyorum kendimi.” 
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length of his stay, we made his food, hosted his guests, helped around. As 
you can see, it is completely voluntary. We do not do this because it is in 
our belief. We go to church and we pray because of our belief. This, 
however, is voluntary. It gives me peace to serve the church voluntarily. It 
makes me happy and powerful. We really enjoy it. We do things here that 
we do not do at home. At home, we get tired of these chores, but in the 
church we never get tired of these chores. If you really think about God 
when you do these things, you relax and become peaceful, because you 
reach a spiritual bliss. There are people who are paid to do the upkeep of the 
church, such as the zangoç. Zangoç can prepare the breakfast as well. But 
we truly want to do these things. For example, two women, we would wake 
up at 5.30 every morning to serve their breakfast. The priest says, “Please 
do not tire yourselves, we have a zangoç”. But servitude really makes us 
happy, it gives us something rich, a spiritual richness. It is a beautiful thing. 
Just like a family. We pray, we pray to God. We come here to pray, but we 
also get to see each other. It makes me happy. Instead of going and visiting 
these people at their homes, I see them at church.”40 
 
Homes are decorated with images of Christ, the patriarch, and religious leaders. 
Language learning and religious education are also displaced to the church due to a lack 
of schools that aim to nourish minority languages or religions. In Istanbul, the sense of 
community is created around attendance to church since other methods of community 
creation are unlikely due to what I have been referring to as the ghosts of state 
oppression. Church is the space in which most liberties have been given by the Turkish 
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40!“Mesela geçenlerde patrik hazretlerinin yardımcısı geldi buraya bu papaz yeni 
oldu ya onu kutsamak üzere. bir hafta kalışı, yaklaşık 3-4 gün kaldı. Onun burda 
kalışı içerisinde yemeği, bakımı, gelen misafirleri ağırlama. Bu tür yani. 
Anlayacağınız, tamamen keyfi. Bunu inancımız için yapmıyoruz. inancımız için 
kiliseye geliyorz, ayinde bulunuyoruz, yani tamamen istek…Yani seve seve bu 
kiliseye hizmet vermek huzur veriyor. Zevk veriyor. Güç veriyor. Hoşumuza 
gidiyor. Evimizde yapmadığımız şeyleri burda yaptığımız zaman… orda 
yoruluyoruz, burda yorulmuyoruz. burda hiç yorgunluk hissetmiyor insan 
hakkaten. eğer ki gerçekten tanrıyı düşünüyorsanız bu hizmetleri yaptığınızda 
gerçekten rahatlıyorsunuz, çünkü manevi olarak rahatlık hissediyorsunuz. Burada 
zaten ücretli bakıcılar var. Mesela zangoç, o da kahvaltılarını yapabilir. Ama biz, 
biz kendimiz istiyoruz. ben mesela geldik iki kadın biz her sabah 5.30 uyanır gelip 
kahvaltılarını verirdim. Papaz diyor ki üzülmeyin zangoç var! Ama biz bunu 
neden yapıyoruz, birşey veriyor size.. manevi bir zenginlik sağlıyor. bu çok güzel 
bir duygu. Bunu hissetmek… Aile, aile aynen aile. güzel bir aile sevgisi var. güzel 
bir aile bağlantısı var. başka birşey yok. Dualarımız var, tanrıya yakarışlarımız 
var. Yani buraya niye geliyoruz, sadece tanrıya yakarış olarak, ama bir yerde de 
hasret gideriyoruz. Ben mutlu oluyorum. Yani ben bu insanları özel olarak 
evlerine gidip göreceğime kilisede görüyorum.” 
!
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republic; it is the only official cultural right that is approved and recognized by the 
state41 and deemed as a cultural richness, ironically also marking the attribute on the 
basis of which Süryani-Keldani are discriminated against.  
 
According to the item 66/1 of the constitution of Turkey, the term “Turkish” defines 
everyone who is a formal citizen of Turkey (Oran 2005:87). However, in practice 
“Turkish” has been used to refer to specifically Muslim citizens, as demonstrated by 
numerous court decisions that have depicted Christian citizens of Turkey as “nationals 
of foreign countries” (Oran 2005:91). There are legally instituted double standards 
regarding to the community foundations of Christians (Kurban & Hatemi; Kurban), as 
well as discriminatory practices such as that of appointing Muslim headmasters of 
“Turkish origin” to minority schools with Christian headmasters, which demonstrate the 
distrust associated with Christian citizens (Mahçupyan 2004:10) and is an overt 
demonstration of the suspicions regarding Christian citizens. Muslim headmasters were 
instructed to do the following:  
 
   “Observe what is going on in school and inform the ministry of education. 
The main purpose of your presence is not educational. You must control the 
minority teachers. Having been chosen by their own community 
organizations, they cannot protect our interest” (Yumul 94)42.  
 
Despite the discriminatory practices, this community tries to function as unmarked 
citizens by neglecting the glaring Muslim component of what it means to be “Turkish”, 
by relegating religion to a personal realm, even though in effect it is central to the 
in/formal definition of the “Turkish” citizen.  
 
Christians face innumerable injustices and deal with these in different ways. Some 
attribute it to their being marked religious subjects. When a young girl such as Nathali 
expresses a desire to live in a Christian country with “my own people”, she is also 
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41 In the last few years, municipals of Beyoğlu have been conducting celebratory visits 
to churches in Christmas and Easter.  
42 “Burada olup biteni takip etmek ve bizlere haber vermek sizing göreviniz. Eğitim 
öğretimle ilgili göreviniz o kadar önemli değil. Sizler azınlıklardan olan öğretmenleri 
çok iyi control etmelisiniz. Onlar vakıfları tarafından seçilmiş kişiler olarak bizim 
menfaatlerimizi koruyamazlar” 
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expressing that she feels alienated in Turkey because of her religion. Others deal with 
this segregation either by denying that such injustices only happen to the Christians of 
Turkey, or by universalizing injustices to the whole world and thereby naturalizing and 
de-personalizing them, as demonstrated by the following quote from a middle-aged 
male interlocutor in the community. Zekiye belongs to this latter group.  
 
   “[speaking of discrimination] of course I know it exists. Unfortunately 
there is discrimination, but not only in Turkey. Same racism and religious 
discriminations exist in Europe. For example in Northern Ireland the 
Protestants and the Catholics are killing each other.. We say it is a religious 
problem, but unfortunately Christians have it among each other too… It is a 
problem in Egypt. In Libya. Is it a Christian problem? No. Humans create 
the problem, as philosophy goes, human is the biggest enemy to humans. 
Unfortunately this is how things are. Humans are angels, but also small 
devils, that is how humanity is.”43  
 
The community as represented by Zekiye is the group that very much wants to belong, 
and despite all its attempts, is barred from being complete insiders. This behavior 
demonstrates what race theorist Cheng refers to as “model minority,” a minority group 
that desires to overlook and contain its history of destitution, and identify itself as 
model national subjects, thus becoming a model as to how other minorities should act 
(Cheng:23). Model minority dynamics necessitate the gratification of certain actions or 
inactions, and shunning of others, and beget a particular interpretation of history.  
 
Historically, Jews have been regarded as “model minority” subjects of the nation as 
they have embraced the Turkish language, and have not shown activism around 
minority rights, and are viewed as being smoothly integrated into the public. However, 
recent history demonstrates anti-Jewish policies, such as the evacuation of Jews from 
their villages in Thrace in 1934, which resulted in massive emigration. The details of 
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43!“[ayrılıkçılıktan bahsediyor] biliyorum evet yani. Vardır maalesef tabi, ama bu yalnız 
burda değildir türkiyede değildir. Avrupada da aynı var yani ırkçılık falan, dincilik, 
diyelim mesela hemen hemen şimdiye kadar kuzey irlanda protestantlar ve katolikler 
birbirini... Yani bu yalnız islam hristiyan problemi değildir. Yani her din, bu insani 
problemdir yani. Biz diyoruz dini problem ama maalesef hristyan... Mısır’da problem.. 
Libya’da problem. Hristiyan mı problemi? Yok. İnsan kendi kendine maalesef, 
felsefede hep diyorlar, insan kendi kendine en büyük düşmandır. Gerçi ister istemez 
öyledir yani, aynı zamanda bir melek ama maalesef küçük bir şeytan, insan öyledir.” 
!
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the constitution of Jews as model minority are complex and beyond the means of this 
thesis, however the reader can refer to Rıfat Bali’s works for further information and 
references (Bali 1999). Similarly, even though the issue of Armenian minority rights 
has become heavily debated especially since the assassination of Hrant Dink, for a long 
time majority of Armenians had also been a quiet community that did not voice 
concern, similar to the majority Süryani-Keldani population in Istanbul. Dink’s 
assassination has provided the conditions for increased public demands for Armenian 
minority rights and equalities, and hence caused a change of the Armenian image from 
a quiet and reticent community to a community that demands rights in the public 
sphere, even though such change has also come with negative depictions of Armenians.  
 
The expression “In Lausanne treaty we decided not to ask for minority rights. We do 
not want to be considered as a minority” made by a member of the Süryani-Keldani 
community propagates the idea that minority status—even if model minority status—is 
not a desirable status in Turkey, and is often associated with being ‘foreigner’ and at 
times even “enemy within”, and certainly entails a marked citizenship from which 
certain Süryani-Keldani would like to refrain. Since the foundation of the republic, 
Christian and Jewish subjects of the nation have been depicted as traitors of the state 
who backstab the nation or ally with foreign powers (Yumul 2005:93). There are no 
particular rights attributed to minorities in Turkey. In fact, there are negative 
connotations associated with the term “azınlık”44, such as that of being a “foreigner” or 
a “second class citizen” as Yumul demonstrates through drawing attention to the words 
of a prior president, Süleyman Demirel. Demirel served as the president of Turkey 
between 1993-2000, and during his presidency, as a response to the Kurdish demands 
for minority status, he said the following “Why do they want to be relegated to the 
status of second class citizens by assuming the title of azınlık?” (Yumul 2005: 90)45 
hence demonstrating the stigma attached to minority status.  
 
Since there are not any group-differentiated rights to benefit from, and due to the 
negative connotations of the status of minority, most Christian subjects in Turkey do 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44!Equivalent of the term “minority” in Turkish.!
45 “Neden azınlık hakları verilerek ikinci sınıf vatandaş konumuna düşsünler?” 
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not want to be referred to as a minority (Yumul 2005:100). However, while denying the 
title of “azınlık”, some groups of Süryani-Keldani are not only rejecting a title that only 
is a liability, but they are also adopting the nationalist discourse of antagonism towards 
minority status, and in doing so they find self-emancipation in disapproving of rights-
seeking minorities such as Armenians and Kurds, by casting them as separatists. By 
denying minority status and simultaneously adopting the stigmatizing national stance 
around “minority” status, this community attempts to displace the stigma attached to 
“non-Muslims” onto specific others, thus engaging in a re-interpretation of the stigma 
against “non-Muslims” as that of a stigma towards “minority non-Muslims,” hence 
betraying a hierarchy of minority identities in Turkey. Disparaging of minority rights 
claims also implies a sense of living free of discrimination, thus disguising a brutal past 
of massacres and present injustices. Model-minority rhetoric requires that a specific 
version of history be repeated with neglect of painful and dissonant items. 
 
I argue that the dynamics of “model minority” should not be interpreted simply as an 
act of self-defense towards the majority Muslim population or as a response to the 
hierarchy of minority populations, but also as a self-engaged psychical formation that 
serves to justify a person’s conditions of presence. Discourse of model minority is an 
active involvement in the creation of a dignified self and one’s involvement with life. It 
reflects a desiring subject that wants to make sense out of her presence, even if she 
might be encumbered by discriminatory structures. Certainly, Süryani-Keldani people 
encounter rampant racism throughout their lives. However this does not necessarily 
entail that they lead downtrodden lives. They deal with this oppression by ignoring and 
displacing such painful events and encounters to the wider injustices in the world. They 
reiterate their national identity as citizens of Turkey through verbal stressing of their 
good citizenship practices. Some people seize moments of confrontation as an 
opportunity to instruct people about the native Christians of Turkey, such as when a 
woman corrects her neighbor for using the term “foreigner”. Others utilize such 
confrontations as an affirmation of their own knowledge of history and intellect, as 
when a lady cuts off contact certain people she deems are too opinionated to change.  
 
Cheng says that for people who encounter racism, “there are deep-seated, intangible, 
psychical complications... but this doesn’t mean that minority subject does not develop 
other relations to that injunctive ideal which can be self-affirming or sustaining” 
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(Cheng: 7) Cheng introduces the idea of jouissance that is created around one’s 
engagement with one’s racialization. The concept of jouissance allows one to see the 
self-affirmations and self-understandings people create despite the lack of rights, 
second-class citizenship, and lack of future securities. “Understanding melancholia of a 
raced subject needs to extend beyond a description of her sadness to a sense of how that 
sadness conditions life and shapes subjectivity” (Cheng: 23-24). Racialized melancholia 
is a result of discrimination, however it can also be a source of jouissance, an active 
engagement with one’s conditions of being, therefore a source of meaning for one’s 
condition. It is a formation through which Süryani-Keldani subjects come not only to 
espouse their situation, but also to indulge in it. This approach is useful in trying to 
understand a community not as simply victimized (Eng&Han: 363), but as engaged in 
its wounded identity.  
 
Jouissance does not entail that structural inequalities do not exist. Indeed, racialized 
subject has to go through a painful negotiation of her identity as every Süryani-Keldani 
have to as children and adults, nevertheless she can actively create conditions for 
jouissance. Adoption of the rhetoric of model minority is an affirmation of one’s good 
citizenship, deserved presence, and special status among all the subordinated classes, 
and is a method by which Süryani-Keldani create jouissance out of their subordination.  
 
However, jouissance created around the status of being model minority is not a 
completely self-developed discourse, and neither is it absolute. An analysis of the 
content of Erol Dora’s remarks in the interview on Habertürk about the history of 
Süryani-Keldani is significant in this respect. Dora begins by mentioning their roots in 
Mesopotamian civilizations and the importance of ancient Assyrian civilization to 
world civilization, thus stressing that their presence is enrichment to the image of 
Turkey as a cradle of civilizations. Immediately he moves onto the village evacuations 
of early 1990s. His narrative of history completely omits the atrocities of 1915, and the 
ensuing environment of fear up until the 90’s that resulted in the abandoning of land 
and property in hope of an escape abroad. Why are the village evacuations more 
newsworthy at this particular moment than genocide? Why are migrations during the 
war with Greece which made people fear a rerun of 1915 and forced them to escape not 
newsworthy? Being a model minority comes with consequences of being easily 
manipulated by the state. It requires that the Süryani-Keldani adopt the dominant 
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national discourse, and do not insist on a national identity, or past grievances of the 
state. This is why genocide is omitted from their ethnic histories. Another Süryani-
Keldani says the following about the community: 
 
   “Maybe people do not know about us because we are a small community. 
Up until the 80s and 90s, people in Turkey had not heard of the Chaldean 
Church. We must also say that we do not talk much about ourselves; we do 
not say ‘such and such happened to us, these things happened to us’. We 
say, ‘the past is past’. We live in the present, like everybody else. We are 
citizens of Turkey or children of this nation. So, we do not have big 
problems. We do not say, ‘things are like such and such because we are 
Christians.’ Of course in the past we suffered because we are Christians, as 
slaves of aghas. Not really slaves but that is what it comes down to.”46 
 
Insofar as Dora speaks of the evacuations of 90s, he is still talking about a catastrophic 
event in Süryani-Keldani memory, but framing it in a way that affirms the necessity of 
evacuation due to the nation’s armed struggle with PKK. Even though he is speaking of 
people’s painful experiences in a public arena, at the same time he is also affirming 
national ideology and state rhetoric of national security. Village evacuations can be 
viewed and talked about in a way that affirms the government’s actions and still makes 
a case against the hardship of being a Süryani-Keldani, but such a stance cannot be 
achieved by mentioning genocide or ongoing ambience of fear. Precedent has made it 
clear that discourses that go against the grain of national ideology, in forms of genocide 
or minority rights, are not allowed to exist in the public arena, and could lead to an 
annulment of his candidacy. Criticisms of state policy are not tolerated and heavily 
punished by the Turkish state, or used as a method to incur people into violent 
demonstrations of nationalism. This attitude demonstrates exactly what model minority 
rhetoric creates—both an affirmation of state ideology, and one’s melancholic, injured, 
yet self-affirming relation to it. Thus model-minority becomes a method by which the 
government tames the Süryani-Keldani identity, as well as a tactic employed by the 
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46!“Belki biz daha az olduğumuz için kimse bizi tanımıyor yani şimdiye kadar 80lere 
90lara kadar kimse Keldani türkiyede olduğunu hemen hemen bilmezdi. Ve biz de 
kendimizden az konuşuyoruz diyeceğiz, biz böyle oldu veya bize şöyle oldu bilmem ne, 
biz demişiz geçmiş geçmiş zaman geçmiştir, şimdi yaşıyoruz ve herkes gibi burda yani, 
türk vatandaşıyız ya da bu ülkenin çocuklarıyız, ona göre yani problemlerimiz pek çok 
yok. Yani hristiyan olarak demiyoruz böyle ya da şöyle... ama tabi ki geçmişte problem 
ister istemez hristiyan olarak ya da bir agha kölesi olarak, köle değildir de gerçi ama 
yani sonuç öyleydi.”!
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Süryani-Keldani as constitutive of what Süryani-Keldani’s are like—and to delineate 
whom (Armenian, Rum) they are not like. Hence, on a public introduction of his 
candidacy to the nation, Dora is motivated to exclude these painful facts from his 
narrative. As much as the rhetoric of model minority is assumed by the Süryani-Keldani 
community in an effort to differentiate themselves from other minorities, discourse of 
‘model minority’ is also a means by which the state dominates over discourses of 
identity.  
 
Dora is not the quintessential model minority. His later calls for multicultural rights in 
Mardin are at odds with the discourse of model minority, which demonstrate that as 
much as model minority is a taming discourse and a method of jouissance, it is not an 
overarching discourse that closes down all other possibilities of being. Dora’s 
candidacy as a Süryani-Keldani that demands minority rights stretches the boundaries 
of the model minority discourse by delineating a discontented minority that actively 
seeks emancipation from subordination. Dora goes beyond the model of being the 
representative of a model minority; however, he still needs to resort to the silences 
necessitated by condition of being a model minority when it comes to certain issues, 
such as genocide, the mention of which could lead to the annulment of his position. 
Dora’s call for multicultural rights is aberrance from model minority discourse; 
however, in a desire to make his presence officially recognized within a general public, 
he needs to refrain from certain issues and self-censor. 
 
Certainly the concealment of the past in an effort to form jouissance around being a 
model minority sometimes leads to generations of young people who are unaware of the 
extent of the disasters that befell their grand relatives, even though they might, and do, 
find out about their histories as adults. Model minority discourse can be central to one’s 
understanding of self and one’s self-confidence as it might distance a brutal past, and 
the alienations such a sense of injustice can cause. In doing so, model minority 
discourse becomes a restraint against more rebellious forms of self-arrangements. 
However, at times, a relative passes onto the child the burden of the knowledge of a 
horrible family history that was so carefully hidden from him by the state, as happens 
when an interlocutor deemed was the beginning of his interest in his identity and 
history: “When I turned 18, my father gave my Gabriela Yonnan’s book about the 
Assyrian Genocide.” People also hear about these issues over the internet, through the 
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voices of a diaspora that is actively engaged with Assyrian history, and hence Seyfo, 
which means “sword” in Suryoyo and represents the massacres of 1915. Even though 
model minority acts as a discourse that closes down other modes of being, I argue that 
possibility of jouissance should not be considered an essentialization of identity. People 
do become conflicted by the disjunction between their identities as model minority and 
the injustices they face in daily life as a result of their Christianity, the misguided 
symbolisms associated with it in the public mindset, as well as increasing knowledge 
about their past. 
 
 
 
3.2.2. “It would be nice to live with my own people”  
 
 
The other intimate community within the Süryani-Keldani community in Istanbul 
consists of people who easily deny their “Turkishness”. Community epitomized by 
Nathali is economically disadvantaged and recently uprooted47. An interlocutor in his 
early 20s described his arrival in Istanbul as follows: 
 
   “We were obligated to leave the village and move to Istanbul. We had lots 
of disadvantages, of course, lacking savings. We received our things from 
the land, and so we had nothing in our hands without our land. We had to 
migrate. We had nothing when we arrived in Istanbul. Absolutely zero. We 
came with nothing. We started school, and of course we had difficulties 
with Turkish because we did not speak it.”48  
 
These people had to abandon their native villages in Tur Abdin49 or Şırnak in the last 
20-30 years. Forced to abandon their homesteads, they found themselves in a 
metropolis as farmers, lacking economic, social and symbolic capital. Many moved on 
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47 In early 90s many Süryani-Keldani villages were evacuated in the state military 
campaign against the PKK. 
48!“mecbur köyü boşaltıp İstanbul’a yerleştik tabi ki. Eee çok çok dezavantajlarla geldik 
çünkü hani bir birikim yok birşey yok hani toprağın.. elindeki hani, nasıl diyim, 
toprağından çıkıyorsun yani....Göç etmek zorunda kaldık. Elimizde birşey yokken 
geldik buralara. Hani sıfır yani. Sıfır geldik. İşte okula başladık ve okuldayken tabi 
dilimiz Türkçe olmadığı için sıkıntı çektik bayağı. 
!
49 Tur Abdin is one of the native lands of Süryani-Keldani community. It ranges from 
eastern Mardin to Şırnak provinces of modern day Turkey.  
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to Europe, and those who remained lament not having left upon having heard of the 
relative financial ease of relatives in diaspora. Below is excerpt from a lady reflecting 
on the village she had to abandon:   
 
   “It was a very precious village. We had a garden and olive trees. People 
would plant rice, wheat and other grains. We farmed and we had animals. 
Thank goodness we had this land. Everything we ate and had was from the 
village. We had a garden and we ate lots of dried figs. We were there until 
PKK came about. Government said that it cannot build a police station for 
every couple of homes, it said that we had to leave. All our villages, so 
many of them. All villages with a small population, be it Christian or 
Muslim, had to abandon their lands. People migrated. They moved us out. 
So we left the villages, all our olives and gardens, all those precious things. 
Most came and said, “what are we going to do in Istanbul?”. Most remained 
in Midyat for a year. Then they said, “What are we going to do here?”. We 
have no village, we own nothing, what are we going to do? We were all 
farmers. We were not educated or anything, nor had we any money. They all 
wrote to Germany. It was easy during those times. Some went to Germany, 
some to Belgium. Both of my sisters went to Belgium. My sister-in-law 
went to Sweden. They all went to different places. But most went to 
Germany... Perhaps you remember from the TV, they emptied the villages 
during PKK period. Then we said, we better leave and go abroad. It is a 
good thing they left. Now they are living in a good condition. They got jobs. 
Social system looked after them well, thank goodness. Some got jobs, and 
social system took care of the others.” 50 
!
The native language of this intimate community is Suryoyo. Suryoyo names of their 
villages as well as their last names were changed by the state, even though they still 
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50 “Çok değerli bir köydü. Bahçemiz vardır zeytinlerimiz vardır. Pirinç ekiyorlardı, 
buğday muğday, hep ekiyorlardı. Ekim yani çiftçilik çok şükür şeyimiz vardır, 
herşeyimiz ordan geliyordu. Bahçemiz vardı, hep kuru incirimiz ordan. Ondan sonra 
yavrum kaldık, sonra o PKK çıkana kadar. Hükümet dedi her bir iki haneye bir karakol 
yapamam, mecbur çıkacaksınız. Yani bizim köyler çok yani. Ordan. Hristiyan köyleri, 
müslüman köyleri, az olanı hadi çıkartıyor. Göç ettiler çıkarttılar, olduğu gibi köyü 
bıraktılar, o kadar zeytinleri, o kadar bahçeleri o kadar değerli şeyler. (daha önceki 
kilisedeki bir konuşmamızda kiliselerin soyulduğunu değerleri şeylerin çalındığını 
anlatmıştı) Hepsi kaldı. Geldiler. Çoğu da geldiler, dediler, “İstanbul’da napacaz?” Bir 
sene yakın Midyat’ta kaldılar. Ondan sonra dediler biz burda napıcaz? Köyümüzden 
olduk, eşyamızdan olduk, biz burda ne iş yapıcaz? Çiftçi hani. Ne okumuştuk ne 
şeyimiz var. Kalktılar hepsi Almanya’ya yazdı.. O zamanlar kolaydır. Kimi 
Almanya’ya gitti, kimi Belçika’ya. İki kız kardeşim Belçika’da. Bir görümce İsveç’te. 
Her biri bir yere gittiler, ama çoğu da Almanya’ya gitti... Televizyondan belki 
hatırlıyorsun PKK zamanında köyleri boşalttılar. O zaman dedik en iyisi dışarı gittiler. 
İyi ki gittiler. Şimdi orda durumları güzeldir. İş buldular orda sosyal bakıyordu sağolsun 
o sosyal çok bakıyordu onlara, kimi iş buldu, kimi sosyal baktı şimdiye kadar yani.”!
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know and adhere to these Suryoyo names, and feel alienated from the generic Turkish 
last names that were assigned by government officials. They have very large families, 
often seven eight siblings, or more. Extended families are extremely divided, with 
almost everyone living abroad. They feel primarily as Christians, and to a lesser extent 
Assyrians. The younger generation especially feels alienated in Istanbul, and often is 
vocal about it: “It would be nice to live with my own people51”. These are the 
precarious citizens of the nation. Religion is central to this group as is to the first group. 
However, unlike the first group, language is also important and they regret lacking the 
option of teaching it to their kids. Below is an excerpt relayed by an interlocutor about 
the time when she was visiting her son in Germany: 
   “We went to Germany in winter. My son was driving. There was frost on 
the road and he had an accident. The police came. Meanwhile my brother 
told his older brother to move his car to the curb so that other cars would not 
skid and hit us. The German police officer who overheard him was really 
surprised, so he asked, “what language are you speaking?” I said that we 
speak Aramaic—Chaldean is Aramaic. Then the police said, “Wow, so you 
know that language?” I said, “yes it is our native language”. He said, “This 
is an ancient language. Do you know how old it is? It is ancient” I said, 
(laughs) that it is our native language. Then the police said, “Please never 
forget this language! It is a beautiful language.” They know it there too. 
They know it is an old language. My son said, “It is our language, our native 
language. We are Chaldean and we speak in this language”. It is so. We did 
not learn history. All I know is what my elders told me. It is old. Our village 
was really old too, who knows when people first started living there…” 52  
 
Many people in this intimate community are proud of their language Suryoyo, and often 
mention that is it the language of Jesus Christ. Having such an allegiance to a language 
that is unprotected and neglected by the state adds to their subordination and 
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51 “Kendi milletimin insanlarıyla birlikte olmak belki daha iyi olurdu.” 
52 “Almanyaya gittik kışın, oğlum, çok buzlanma oldu yolda oğlum kaza yaptı orda, 
polis geldi. Ondan sonra oğlum kardaşına demiş, arabanı çek, arabalara geliyor 
vuruyor, kayıyor. baktım Alman polis şaştı kaldı, dedi, bu ne dilde konuşuyorsunuz? 
Dedi aramica’dır—keldanice aramica aynı—dedim. Aman, diyor, sen bu dili biliyor 
musun? Evet diyorum, anadilimizdir. Bu diyor, bu dil çok eski bir dildir, dedi. Bu dil 
biliyor musun ne kadar eskidir? Çok eskidir. E diyorum bizim dilimiz budur. Ay diyor 
sakın bu dili unutmayın! Bu dil çok güzel bir dil. Orda da biliyorlar. Eski bir dildir 
diyor, onlar biliyorlar. Hangi tarihte... bililiyorlar yani Almanlar biliyorlar. Şaştı kaldı, 
bu dil, nasıl biliyor sunuz? Oğlan da diyor, bizim dilimiz, anadilimiz budur! Biz 
keldaniyiz yani bu dilde konuşuyoruz. Öyledir. Biz tarih okumadık. Bildiğim, 
büyüklerin bize anlattığı budur yani. Eski şeydir. Mesela bizim köy o kadar eskiydi... 
kim bilir hangi zamanda ordalardı.” 
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resentment. Most of them have already migrated to Christian countries, are leaving, or 
regret not having left at a younger age. If anything ties them to Turkey, it is the 
presence of close family members in İstanbul. A young interlocutor who wants to leave 
Turkey said that he can easily forget his friends in İstanbul and start new relationships 
in Europe:  
   “We will forget friends in Turkey in a few days. If we go there we will 
work with our brothers. It is not about the economy that I want to 
leave…It’s not because Turkey is not doing well economically. Our 
relations are there. It is hard for us here. I only have an aunt left in Turkey… 
Some of my friends want to leave, and others are not like me, they do not 
want to leave their parents alone. They say that they would go if their 
parents came along too. But I do not feel that way.”53 
 
Due to a longer history of presence in the native lands, certain people also have a wider 
access to local memory and events. The following excerpt from an interview attests to 
both the presence of local memory, as well as the generational differences in how the 
past is blocked and recalled: 
   “My mother would not tell anything to us. Neither my mom nor my dad 
would tell us anything. My grandmother was a very wise woman and she 
would tell us everything. She would sit, and tell and tell. When we were kid 
we’d say, “why are you telling so much?”. And she’d say, “you do not 
understand now. But when you grow up, you will understand.” She was 
correct, that is how things are. People need to know. I wish I had listened to 
my grandmother but I did not. But my mom would not tell anything. Neither 
my mom nor my dad would tell anything… I don’t know why they weren’t 
telling. I don’t know why, but they would not tell things. It’s like that. They 
would never tell. But my grandmother, she was so wise. She would tell us 
everything. Do not stray from God’s way, she would tell things like that too. 
Do not lie, do not steal, do not do such and such when you grow up. Do not 
discriminate people. If you work, be loyal to your state, pay your taxes, do 
such as such… She would tell so much. She would tell about what happened 
to them in the past.. [implying the genocide that she had mentioned earlier 
during our conversation]”54 
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53 “bir gün iki gün ondan sonra unuturuz. Oraya gitsek orda çalışçaz abilerle... 
Ekonomiyle alakası yok ki gitmek istememin. Buranın durumu kötü diye değil. 
Akrabalar orda. Yani bize zor.burda bir halam var.. Var arkadaşlarım var. Ya kimisi 
istiyor kimisi diyor ailem da gitse gelirim. Onlar benim gibi düşünmüyor, aileyi 
bırakmak istemiyorlar. Ama anne babam gelse giderdik diyor. Ama bende o şey yok.”!
54 “Annem hiçbir şey anlatmıyordu bize, hiçbir şey anlatmıyordu ne baba ne anne. 
Babaannem çok bilmiş bir kadındı, herşeyi anlatıyordu. Oturuyordu anlatıyordu 
anlatıyordu. Biz çocukken diyoruz, “ne anlatıyorsun?” Ama diyor büyünce anlarsın, 
şimdi anlamıyorsun, büyüyünce anlarsın. Hakkaten öyle. İnsan bilmesi lazım. Ama 
keşke dedim dinleseydim babanemi ama dinlemedim. Ama annem hiçbirşey 
anlatmıyordu. Annem babam hiçbir şey anlatmıyordu. Bilmiyorum niye ama 
! 53!
 
The community living in Turkey cannot be conceived without fear. A person from the 
community once said “When I see someone in mass that I do not know, I panic. I fear 
bombs.” In another conversation, I witnessed the fact that the church has the right to 
keep the parking space in front empty, because of possibility of car-bomb attacks. Fear 
is a part of life to different extents for different people, and often people may not be 
aware that certain actions are conditioned by fear. Fear has a ghostly presence. 
Christian communities in Istanbul live with fear and uncertainty about future 
protections. Even the denial of genocide carries within it a fear of reprisal. Some people 
shudder with a feeling of having been left out when they see the motto of the Hürriyet, a 
widely read newspaper, printed in large letters on a building in Dolapdere, “Turkey 
belongs to Turks”. As Sara Ahmed says, fear aligns bodies (Ahmed, 2004:69). The 
contact of Süryani-Keldani and majority Muslim create an affect of fear, a historically 
constructed and socially constituted fear, one that comes from interaction and restricts 
bodies. Fear is evident when a pendant of a big cross is tucked away while stepping 
outside, when a European double citizenship is secured, or every time people enter the 
church in İstanbul, atypical because it was converted from a Greek Catholic church, 
whose community now hardly exists due to evacuations. Fear aligns bodies as to how to 
behave. And at times of confrontation fear becomes palpable—as when a conflict 
between two neighbors turns into a confrontation and cautioning to be “ever more 
careful because you are a foreigner” recited by a Muslim neighbor in response to a 
domestic problem. 
 
Numerous members of the Süryani-Keldani community from Turkey have applied to 
European countries for asylum. There are towns in Germany that consist of people who 
migrated as a whole village as is demonstrated by Armbruster (Armbruster 2002). “I am 
going to leave, there is nobody left here” utters a young man in his early 20s, reflecting 
a sense of despair and loneliness. Earlier I mentioned that jouissance around model 
minority can crack at its corners and cease to function as jouissance. This intimate 
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anlatmıyordu. Böyledir böyle... hiç anlatmıyordu. Ama babaannem çok bilmiş bir 
kadındı, herşeyi anlatıyordu. Allahın yolundan çıkmayın, öyle de anlatıyordu. Yalan 
söylemeyin, hırsızlık yapmayın, büyüyünce bilmem ne yapmayın, insanları 
ayırdetmeyin. Eee çalışırsan devletine sadık olun, vergini verin, bilmemne yap.. öyle 
çok şeyler söylüyordu. Geçmişte ne geldiyse onların başına onu söylüyordu.” [Katliama 
değiniyor. Görüşmemizin başlarında katliamdan bahsetmişti]!
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community is also affected by discourses of model minority, as people often reiterate 
their loyalty to the state. However, when economic marginality and social marginality 
are added onto existing institutional inequalities, and in the presence of a very intimate 
tie to an active diaspora in forms of immediate family members, this group is less able 
to form a jouissance around the concept of model minority. Discontented and no longer 
finding self-affirmation in being a loyal minority group, this group is prone to seeking 
other methods of engagement, such as migration, political activism or a wider 
engagement with their ethnic identity.  
 
By their presence as model-minority, Süryani-Keldani presence affirms the romantic 
multi-ethnic illusion of the Turkish state. From the viewpoint of the state, model 
minority helps produce ideas of a tolerant Turkish state that harbors people of different 
religions and ethnicities—as long as they remain reliant. However, the discourse of 
model minority fails when affronted by the question, what happened to the 
predominantly Christian population of eastern Anatolia? Where did people go? The 
rhetoric of model minority, and the fantasies built around it, such as that of a romantic 
multi-ethnic mosaic of Turkey—cracks in the face of massive out-migration of the 
Christian population and vocalized discontent of minorities. The extensive migrations 
abroad are a kill-joy of the Turkish national phantasm because they disrupt the national 
phantasm of a happy multicultural nation, while serving for “Turkification” as people 
leave their lands as a result of state policy. Migration disrupts the affective state of a 
‘happy nation’ because it entails that not everyone is aligned with particular narratives 
of joy, that there are people who feel alienated. Migration is the abandonment of the 
object around which public joy was constructed (Ahmed 2011:37) and a charged site 
where the contradictions of the nation become manifest (Cheng: 21-22). It also disrupts 
mechanisms of self-affirmation of the Süryani-Keldani that remain, which is built 
around being docile, apolitical, calculatedly cultural selves that identify with the 
dominant Turkish identity. Migration disrupts the formation of an identity around 
model minority as content and satisfied. In turn it also creates a need within the 
community that stays a need to constitute its reasons for staying.  
 
Cracking voices have always existed in the community, resulting in forty years of 
migration and separation of families. However, recently they are shaping in ways other 
than migration, as epitomized by Dora’s election as a member of the parliament. This 
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has to do both with the astringent visa procedures of European countries who used to 
admit Christians as political refugees, as well as activisms for minority rights in Turkey. 
Through Erol Dora, public has witnessed the discontented voices of Süryani-Keldani, 
which are dissonant both with the public opinion that imagined a homogenous, peaceful 
and inclusive Turkish identity, and also dissonant with parts of the Süryani-Keldani 
community who purported unproblematic existence. Economic underprivileges, 
challenges to learning the native language, challenges to the integrity of religious 
establishments, such as lawsuits regarding the property of Mor Gabriel monastery,55 
challenges to one’s self-confidence that shatters at finding out a brutal history are 
factors that continue to alienate people. Below is an excerpt from a young interlocutor’s 
discovery of his Christianity and difference, as well his sense of the changing 
circumstances: 
 
   “We grew up slowly. In primary school, we were still children, up until 6th 
or 7th grade. After that you start interrogating yourself, even if you are still 
just a kid. Of course this [discovery] will be more pronounced in the future. 
It will…it will take certain solid forms in the future, certain perspectives… 
Certain things, you know, people set milestones. Milestones about who you 
are, what you are, where you come from, what you want to do. People start 
solidifying certain opinions. Even though these opinions may not be a 
hundred percent set in stone, they can still alter, they are still settling. You 
especially realize this in middle school. Yes, you are living in the Republic 
of Turkey. You become aware of your sub-identity, you discover it, that 
sub-identity… for me, it became especially prominent in the last few years, 
but I realized it first at school. This sub-identity. Otherwise I could have lost 
it (laughs)... At first, you are like, what language am I speaking? (laughs) 
Ok, you are living in the republic of Turkey, but this is not Turkish! So little 
by little you start interrogating yourself, although of course everybody does 
it differently. It wasn’t only me who did this, people around me, relatives, a 
lot of people engaged in this kind of self-questioning. Then… okay, we’re 
past middle school, it grew stronger in high school. You learn the laws in 
the country you live in and act accordingly, but... I found out that my sub-
identity has disadvantages in this country. For example I am recently 
finding out from reading a book about minorities that, as it turns out, I have 
minority rights in this country as per Lausanne Treaty. Now, if I try to 
exercise these rights, for example open a school to teach Aramaic language, 
I think that certain people might automatically view me as a separatist. Do 
you I want these rights, yes I do want these rights, but I also want the proper 
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55 Mor Gabriel is a 1600 year-old Süryani monastery and its land came into dispute in 
2009. For reference, refer to Baskın Oran’s article at 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalEklerDetayV3&ArticleID=103
9217 
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conditions to be created for me to exercise these rights, you see? In the 
future, I don’t know, I would like my nephews and nieces, and if I have my 
own children, to learn my language, culture and history, even though we are 
living in the republic of Turkey, I would still like to learn…”56 
 
Süryani-Keldani community also is a part of the diasporic and local minority rights 
claims. The community has especially been affected by Kurdish rights movements, 
such as BDP, as evidenced by Dora’s nomination and ultimate election as a candidate 
supported by BDP, a mainly Kurdish party that espouses the recognition of minority 
identities and rights. Orhan Miroğlu, a Kurdish columnist, politician and author, has 
written perhaps what has been the first popular book about Seyfo in Turkey, Affet Bizi 
Marin. The community is also inevitably affected by the increasing demands for 
Armenian minority rights that followed Dink’s assassination, which considerably 
altered the image of Armenians within the public sphere. Political activism, such as the 
one that led to election of Erol Dora as a representative in the parliament and a 
spokesman for demanding minority rights, as well as other forms of engagement with 
an ethnic identity—such as shooting a documentary about the situation of Mor Gabriel 
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56 “Yani tabi yavaş yavaş büyüdük. İlkokulda hala biraz çocukluk vardı. İlkokul, nasıl 
diyelim, altıncı yedinci sınıfa kadar diyelim, xxx yavaş yavaş biraz kim olduğunu 
sorgulamaya başlıyor insan, hani çocuk da olsa. Tabi bu ilerde gençliğe daha çok 
yansıcak. Biraz daha... kalıplara oturacak yani. Bazı görüşler olsun... Bazı şeyler hani, 
bazı temel taşları koyuyor insan. Yani kim olduğunu, ne olduğunu, nereden geldiğini, 
ne yapmak istediğini. İşte görüşleri biraz daha, yüzde yüz kesin olmamakla beraber 
hani kesinleştiriyor. Iııı... özellikle ortaokuldayken yani hani biraz daha farkına 
varıyorsun. Evet, türkiye cumhuriyeti devletinde yaşıyorsun hani, alt kimlik, alt 
kimliğini keşfediyorsun yani, o alt kimliği... yani... ııı.. ben.. ıı.. son zamanlarda biraz 
daha kendi açımdan ön plana çıktı ama biraz daha okuldayken şey oldu bu yani nasıl 
diyim, keşfettim yani. Bu alt kimliği. Yoksa gümbürtüde gitçekti (gülüyor)... Iıı yani bir 
kere diyorsun ulan ben nece konuşuyorum (gülüyor) yani hani türkiye cumhuriyetinde 
yaşıyorsun dilin türkçe değil. o yüzden biraz hani ufak da olsa, ufak tefek hani bu 
kişiden kişiye değişir ama biraz sorguluyorsun kendini. O sorgu seni işte, yani ben değil 
sadece benim çevremdeki akrabalarım bir çok kişi belki bunu yaptı. Ondan sonra.. evet 
ortaokulu geçtik, sonra lisede bu biraz daha gelişti. Ama yine de yani sonuçta 
yaşadığım türkiye cumhuriyetinde yasaları öğreniyorsun ve ona göre hareket ediyorsun 
ama. Benim alt kimliğim biraz bu ülkede dezavantajı var çünkü işte yeni yeni 
öğreniyorum, bir kitap okuyorum mesela azınlıklarla ilgili, orada lozandan meğerse 
haklarım varmış benim. Şimdi ben bunları kullanmaya çalışsam acaba, nasıl diyim 
sana, hani aramice öğreneceğim bir okul olsun isterim yani lozandan dolayı xxxx 
kardeşim.. ama bir takım çevreler düşünüyorum yani beni otomatikmen bölücü olarak 
görücekler heralde böyle bir şeye kalkışsam. İstemiyorum mu isterim ama koşulların da 
oluşmasını isterim, anladın mı? Yani ileride bilmiyorum hani belki yeğenlerim belki 
kendi çocuklarım öğrensin isterim yani dilimi kültürümü (geçmiş?)imi her ne kadar 
Türkiye cumhuriyetinde yaşasak da isterim yani öğrenmek.” 
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monastery as another interlocutor was passionate about—are ways in which Süryani-
Keldani are engaging in novel constructions of self and engagements with their 
ethnicity. These forms of engagement are forms of resistance against discrimination 
towards Christian and other minority subjects and histories, and hence grind against the 
national state ideology that imagined a happy multicultural nation. 
 
 
 
3.3. Subjectivities 
 
 
It is essential at this point that I interrupt ethnographic analysis in order to elaborate 
on the sort of subjectivity that I am arguing for in trying understand this particular 
community. Brian Massumi describes the subject as being endlessly capable of 
potential. His subject is one that can always find the “wiggle room” and maneuver 
difficult situations:  
 
   Your participation in this world is part of a global becoming. So it’s about 
taking joy in that process, wherever it leads, and I guess it’s about having a 
kind of faith in the world which is simply the hope that it continue... But 
again, it is not a hope that has a particular content or end point – it’s a desire 
for more life, or for more to life. (Massumi:242) 
 
According to this conception, the subject is endlessly capable of finding new outlets of 
self-expression and satisfaction. However, I argue that the possibility of jouissance 
around the concept of model minority or around a political engagement with one’s 
ethnic identity does not entail that everyone can engage in such self-affirming 
arrangements. People can fall into despair and resentment. Not everyone can do such 
psychic gymnastics57.  Hence the subject is not a free-floating self that ceaselessly 
manages to seek and find jouissance, as Massumi’s defines it to be (Massumi: 214).  
 
On the other hand, in “Mourning and Melancholia” Freud describes the subject as being 
bound by an endless despair: 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 Yıldırım, Umut 
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   The complex of melancholia behaves like an open wound, drawing 
investment energies to itself from all sides…and draining the ego to the 
point of complete impoverishment (Freud: 212) 
 
This sort of subjecthood describes a subject who has a constant wound, and this wound 
drains out all the energy so that the subject is not capable of emancipation or jouissance. 
Instead, I argue that there are instances when people are able to form jouissance and 
find self-affirmation, as described in many instances through this paper. People doubt 
their presence every now and then, some more than others, as when a person days “I’m 
okay in general. But every now and then I feel very strange”. And there are people who 
are not endlessly capable of finding self-affirmation, and become resentful, such as the 
young man who has no emotional or social ties to Turkey, nor has many chances of 
moving out while also remaining in a “legal” status. However, people are capable of 
meaningful constructions that make life meaningful and in which they can find the 
strength for emancipation. 
 
Diaspora develops for itself new modes of being, thus complicating the ethnic subject 
of Süryani-Keldani, forming new intimate communities around other forms of 
jouissance—such as that of an engagement with Seyfo. Whereas people rarely mention 
Seyfo in Turkey, Seyfo is the beginning, the undercurrent, and the conclusion of 
inquiries about the Süryani-Keldani identity in the diaspora. People engage with 
Süryani-Keldani history and identity, therefore Seyfo, in academics, daily life, in art 
and music. Biner claims that an engagement with Seyfo is made in an effort to assert a 
transnational unity and to vocalize a history that has been silenced due to the silencing 
of genocide (Biner: 368). Research and engagement with Süryani-Keldani identity, 
which was not imaginable in Turkey, becomes a new concept around which desire 
forms in the diaspora. People from all over Europe, academicians and lay men alike, 
gather for a conference on Seyfo. The conference itself, as well as its content, is a way 
of reconciling the past with the present, as they have been unable to do so for a century, 
and an attempt to understand the close encounter to death, the pain of lost ones, and 
why they have lived on.58  
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58 Unfortunately this study only provides a brief overview of the diasporic communities. 
For more information, refer to Biner 2011. 
! 59!
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4  MULTICULTURALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS  
 
 
 
 
   He says, [referring to Dora] “Süryani community has been living here for 
6500 years; they are natives to this land. And they have problems.” But the 
Catholic Keldani and Orthodox Süryani communities belong to different 
churches. One doesn’t know the other. We do not have anything to do with 
certain individuals.59  
 
Anonymous letter on Bayer’s column 
 
Having presented the ethnography, I would like to return to the anonymous letter that 
was published in Bayer’s column and the pursuant reply with the knowledge of intimate 
communities in Turkey and the diaspora. The anonymous letter that was published in 
Bayer’s column reflected the sensitivities of an intimate community of Süryani-Keldani 
that has understood and accepted its position in Turkey as a model minority, and forms 
its justification around the concept of being a model minority.  
 
The anonymous author of the letter was uncomfortable about the fact that Dora will join 
BDP, a predominantly Kurdish party: “A member of the parliament chosen by the 
proponents of BDP”60, because s/he feared being cast in the ranks of the Kurdish rights 
movement. Even though the political party of BDP has many members that are 
ideologically against violent Kurdish guerilla attacks, the author is afraid that 
demonstrating support for BDP could be interpreted as being implicated in an armed 
guerilla struggle, and hence cause disdain, hatred, and incur nationalist racisms from a 
big part of the nation. S/he fears being cast as divisive people, which was the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 “Süryaniler bu bölgede 6500 yıllık tarihleri olan yerli bir halktır. Dolayısıyla onların 
da sıkıntıları var’ diye konuşuyor. Oysa, Katolik Keldaniler ve Ortodoks Süryaniler ayrı 
kiliselere bağlıdır. Kimin ne olduğu bilinmez. Bizim şahıslarla ilgimiz olamaz.” 
60 “BDP yandaşları tarafından seçilen bir milletvekili” 
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precondition that justified Seyfo in the eyes of the administration. This is why s/he ends 
the letter by reiterating loyalty to the nation of Turkey, stressing national unity of the 
Turkish republic, saying that they are content with the liberties in Turkey, and 
outsourcing what she deems to be the divisive discourse of Dora to the diaspora in 
Sweden, a community that cannot be persecuted by courts of Turkey.  
 
Hence s/he reflected the fears of a sizeable Süryani-Keldani population, even though 
s/he disregarded the problems of others, especially those who voted for Dora, and those 
in Istanbul who might have voted for a similar stance such as Dora’s had there been a 
candidate espousing multicultural rights for the Süryani-Keldani in their electoral 
districts. In this way, the letter contradicted more actively political modes of existence, 
and undermined efforts and conditions leading to a call for increased rights, as it 
reproduced what I have been referring to as the “model minority discourse”, conditions 
and implications of which I tried to explain in the previous chapter. It is also 
noteworthy that the author currently lives in Sweden. S/he has access to multicultural 
rights, and still rejects them. Hence s/he expresses the concerns of a group of Süryani-
Keldani, whereas that particular community s/he represents is so cautiously apolitical 
that it chooses not to speak for itself, at least not publicly, but someone who lives in 
Sweden feels impelled to speak in their place.  
 
Bartuma replied to this letter with an accusation: “Nobody would want to represent 
these people who doubt their Süryani identity.” This reply reflects concerns of yet 
another community. Compared to the linguistic unity and cultural vibrancy of the 
Süryani-Keldani community in Europe, certain groups of Süryani-Keldani might appear 
assimilated. Nevertheless, such an accusation that blames certain Süryani-Keldani for a 
lack of cultural and ethnic feelings misses out on all the circumstances that lead to 
assimilation, and denies other forms of Süryani-Keldani identities that have formed 
around different desires, thus dictatedly insisting on a single identity that might be 
inconceivable or unrealizable in other circumstances. Therein is evident a shortcoming 
of multiculturalism and multicultural policies. An attempt to hierarchize people’s 
allegiance to a Süryani-Keldani identity inevitably disregards the desires, self-
justifications, and political, economical, and psychological circumstances that lead to 
different formations and constitutions of self as Süryani-Keldani. Furthermore, when 
Bartuma criticizes the author for willingly acting as a slave to the Turkish government, 
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Bartuma does not take into consideration the dangers, uncertainties, the fear, and self-
sacrifices that will come along with such rights-claims, and disregards the fact that 
many people like himself have chosen to leave Turkey instead of staying and getting 
persecuted while demanding multicultural rights. Such an accusation also forgets that 
people in Turkey do not have the flexibility of movement abroad that Süryani-Keldani 
had at one point, and thus might be compelled to justify the reasons for staying by 
creating a discourse of well-being. 
 
Erol Dora expresses a need for multicultural rights. This was perhaps the first time such 
a need was announced publicly in Turkey, for and by the Süryani-Keldani population. It 
was certainly the first time such an issue was addressed by a member of the parliament 
as a concern of the Süryani-Keldani population. As I have argued before, model 
minority dynamics have curbed such claims by assuming both a rhetoric of 
complacency and unproblematic, exemplary citizenship. In order to understand why 
subdued presence of a model minority contradicts the tenets of multiculturalism, I first 
refer to the theoretical bases of multiculturalism.  
 
 
 
4.1. Multiculturalism 
 
 
Marshall’s theorization of citizenship in terms of political, civic, and social rights 
(Marshall 1964) assumes a homogenous society and fails to account for cultural rights. 
Cultural rights often take the form of a desire to learn, speak, publish, broadcast and 
educate in one’s native language, or the freedom to observe and practice one’s faith, 
customs and traditions. Cultural rights are values that a community considers as core 
values. Often times the inrecognition of these rights creates social and structural 
problems for the community, such as when kids who have been speaking their native 
languages at home begin their formal education at schools, in a language they do not 
understand, which makes them fall behind from the curriculum. The curriculum, shaped 
by the interests of the majority, presupposes a basic working knowledge of a language 
that some students may not know. This creates both structural and psychological 
setbacks. Similarly, curbing of other cultural rights create wider social, economic and 
political inequalities. 
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Kymlicka offers the concept of multiculturalism. The main idea underlying 
multiculturalism is that certain groups need special rights in order to sustain equality. 
Multiculturalism, as offered by Kymlicka, consists of group-differentiated rights that 
aim to eliminate the inequalities that arise as a result of cultural difference, which lead 
to disempowered forms of citizenship—such as failure to be involved in or active 
discrimination from civic, political, economical and social systems (Kymlicka, 
1995:37-8). Multiculturalism dislocates a deterministic materialistic approach that 
describes proportional assimilation with increasing capital. Kymlicka claims that 
material wealth fails to ensure the integration of certain groups into the common 
culture, hence necessitating minority rights and differentiated group statuses in order to 
overcome existing inequalities and to ensure democratic citizenship 
(Kymlicka&Norman 4). Multiculturalism also rests on the acknowledgment that the 
laws and institutions of states are generally geared towards and by the interests of  the 
majority, hence disadvantaging certain minority groups. Multiculturalism demonstrates 
an attentiveness to the needs of minority groups, who can never have a majority  in 
order to make their voices heard, hence espouses a different understanding of 
democracy that does not insurordinate minority groups who cannot make their voice 
heard through majority representation. Multiculturalism stands for the existence of 
group-differentiated rights for minority groups, who cannot have a majority population 
in order to address their values and concerns in a democratic system of majority 
representation.  
 
Multiculturalism defends the existence of a multiplicity of canons, languages, and rights 
for self-determined groups. It is based on the premise that traditional citizenship, which 
has been applauded for increasing equality between citizens and through the nation, is 
not a concept that regards people’s rights equally, but rather recognizes and propagates 
rights of certain groups more than, and at the expense of, other group rights. Some 
criticisms of multiculturalism are about its tendency to ratify divisions and inequalities 
along the lines of ethnicity, and thereby dividing the society further, inciting religious 
and ethnic violence. Nevertheless such a criticism disregards that the current rampant 
assimilatory practices of citizenship also create widespread inequalities and often result 
in violence, alienation or migration. Another criticism of multiculturalism, one that 
concerns this thesis the most, is its tendency to essentialize ethnic identity. This mainly 
stems from a particular understanding of “culture,” which reifies linguistic and ethnic 
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unity. Essentialization of “culture” in this way results in a hierarchization of the ethnic 
group, and essentially recreates within the minority community the evolutionist notions 
of high culture that multiculturalism had initially set out to avert. The hierarchies 
created as a result of this essentialization caused certain groups to feel alienated in 
response to Dora’s remarks, and therefore claim “Erol Dora is not our representative”. 
It is also this essentialization that gave rise to a notion of high culture that enabled the 
accusations of “assimilated” and “those who doubt their Süryani identity” in response to 
differing notions of presence conditioned by differing social, political and economic 
circumstances. 
 
 
 
4.2. Multiculturalism’s discontents 
 
 
Responses surrounding Dora’s call for multicultural rights, epitomized by the 
anonymous author and Bartuma’s reply, demonstrate that there are conflicts within the 
community as to what a Süryani-Keldani identity entails. I have argued that the 
conditions that lead to conflicts, and therefore the varying conceptions of a Süryani-
Keldani identity, are not arbitrary, but are embedded in the historical present, and are 
guided by psychological, institutional and economic structures. Herein is a critique of 
multiculturalism as it tends to essentialize group identities in demanding group-
differentiated rights. Multiculturalism is a demand for differentiated group rights, and in 
doing so it assumes ethnic communities to be coherent wholes, which they rarely are.  I 
adopted the concept of intimate communities in order to demonstrate the different 
points of views and methods of self-affirmation within the community, and referred to 
theories of affect in delineating the mechanisms at play in the constitution of intimate 
communities.  
 
In calling for multicultural rights, certain communities hierarchize ethnic identity by 
creating a vision of a “proper” ethnic subject, hence casting other communities as 
“lacking”, thereby occluding the institutional and psychological circumstances that have 
lead to the appearance of certain communities as “lacking”.  A claim for equality 
spoken in the language of multicultural rights celebrates a particular ethnic identity, one 
that possesses and defines itself through these ethnic attributes—and creates inner 
conflicts with people of other Süryani-Keldani intimate communities that have formed 
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their self-arrangements in alternate ways, thus hierarchizing ethnic identity. This paper 
attempted to show the multiple formations of ethnic identity that do not always line up 
with expectations about the definition of a proper ethnic subject. A call for 
multiculturalism that is premised solely on rights that are due for the restoration of the 
proper ethnic subject at best neglects, and often accuses other intimate communities for 
being “assimilated,” whereas the reasons for their fall-from-grace is state policy of 
manipulation in the first place (Povinelli: 48). 
 
My attempt to create an understanding is not meant to equate all existences. People in 
Turkey might benefit from increased freedoms. Model minority discourse is a discourse 
of fear. Imaginings of a good, untroubled, unmarked life are a method of survival 
through creation of jouissance, but they are also a calculated method of fitting in, of 
staying reliant in the presence of a Turkish ethnographer and in the face of a minority 
presence in Turkey, and ultimately self-contradictory. People might act and form 
differently if they were not living in an environment of perpetual fear.  
 
In the first three-quarters of 2011, there have been four threats or attacks aimed towards 
Christians and Christian establishments in Turkey: In January a group of people 
protested in Trabzon about the display of a cross, and threatened the church to “take 
down the cross, or we will take it down”. In April, a person threatened a church in İzmir 
by firing ammunition into the air. Again in April, two people raided a church in Adana, 
armed with knives, attempting to kill or injure the priest. In May, a farmer attacked a 
priest for trespassing. This is the precarious environment in which Christians in Turkey 
find themselves.  
 
Parla points to how recourse to ethnic privilege by post-nineties Turkish immigrants 
from Bulgaria in their demands for citizenship rights in Turkey hierarchize migrant 
groups and hampers possibilities for a wider engagement with injustice (Parla 2011b: 
82). Similarly, a recourse to construction of a proper ethnic subject in demands for 
minority rights by an intimate community of Süryani-Keldani hierarchize the Süryani-
Keldani community at large, by creating an ideal “Süryani-Keldani” image, and thus 
undermining subjects who do not live up to its ideal, and bypassing possibilities for a 
wider engagement against manipulation and subordination that keep Christian and 
Jewish subjects perpetually uncertain about future safeties.  
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Dora’s election as a candidate is monumental—he is the first Süryani-Keldani ever to 
be present in the parliament in the history of the republic of Turkey who is outspoken 
about ethnic rights and ethnic disadvantages. All other minority representatives were 
nominated on the grounds that they were marked subjects only so far as to advertise 
Turkey as a happy multicultural nation, and on the account that they do not speak of 
Turkey’s past crimes (Bali: 64). That makes Dora even more important a presence. It 
might be a step in remaking what it means to be a cultural, religious, and ethnic 
identity, and an attempt to alter the stigma and suspicion attached to Christian and 
Jewish populations of Turkey. However, in doing so, one needs to be aware of how 
ethnic minority rights claims can oppress people even within the same community 
while trying to emancipate others.  
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5  FIELDWORK AMONG EXPERTS AND THE CONCEPT OF PARA-
ETHNOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
 
- How do you deal with the difficulties of being an outsider? 
- By always thinking about it, but also by talking to you.  
 
In a conference regarding the Süryani-Keldani community in the Netherlands, I 
presented a paper about the difficulties of access while doing research in the Süryani-
Keldani community in Turkey by drawing attention to the fact that Seyfo rarely ever 
occurred in the fieldwork in Turkey, which contrasted significantly with the Süryani-
Keldani community that had gathered for a conference in Rijssen to speak specifically 
about Seyfo. I was having difficulties of access both due to the environment of fear, and 
also as a result of my position as an outsider to the community. One of the participants 
in Rijssen asked me how I dealt with the difficulties of being an outsider. Prior to the 
conference, which was a fieldwork on its own as I was a participant-observer among 
the Süryani-Keldani academicians from different European countries, all I could do 
about my outsider status was to keep thinking about it and factor it into my analysis 
from what I could glean from certain interlocutors. I was vociferously critical of the 
state in my interactions in Istanbul in order to assure people that I am not working for 
the government, and also to make them feel safer confiding in me a history that by its 
nature is an act of resistance. However, presence in the conference in Rijssen, the 
Netherlands, where people were not afraid to voice and research what had merely been 
silences or declarations of loyalty to the state in Istanbul, was the most significant 
method by which I started overcoming the difficulties of being an outsider. I could use 
what I learned in Rijssen in order to fill in the silences and omissions in the field of 
Istanbul, as earlier attempted to do while analyzing Dora’s speech. Participating as an 
academician, albeit only one of the couple of non-Süryani-Keldani participants, I was 
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already an insider in Rijssen. In this chapter I would like to explore the differences of 
the ethnography conducted in Rijssen, and its contributions to analysis.  
 
Participation in the conference organized by the Inanna Foundation in the city of 
Rijssen contributed significantly to my research, both by illuminating what had been an 
elusive history and also by helping me frame my arguments. Inanna Foundation was 
established in the Netherlands in 2005, with the aim “to contribute to the educational, 
social, cultural and political development of Assyrian/Syriacs worldwide, with a special 
emphasis on those in Europe.”61 The conference in 2011 was named “Intergenerational 
Approach to the Study of Genocide” and specifically intended to document, further 
research, explore and deal with the political, psychological and social implications of 
Seyfo. There had been other conferences about Süryani-Keldani culture, language and 
ethnicity before, but this was the first conference that specifically concentrated on 
Seyfo. I was anxious to learn about a topic that nobody wanted to mention or talk about 
in Turkey, or even if mentioned, was followed by declarations of loyalty to the state, a 
desire to forget, and a sense of surrender: “it shouldn’t have happened, but it did, what 
can we do”62. I wanted to hear more about Seyfo from the perspective of Süryani-
Keldani, and I was especially curious to hear about the academic research about Seyfo.  
 
Among the participants were genocide scholars, historians, psychologists, philosophers, 
artists and linguists involved in Seyfo or genocide studies from different countries. The 
workshop was filmed by SuryoyoTV, a news channel that reports mainly on issues 
regarding Süryani-Keldani, in order to be broadcasted in the near future in a 
documentary format. I wanted to be there to find out information that might be relevant 
for my thesis and also conduct ethnography within the community who live in various 
European countries. However, the ethnography in Rijssen turned out to have a very 
different quality than most of the ethnography I had conducted in Turkey.  
 
In Rijssen, we talked about Süryani-Keldani history and issues even over 15 minute 
coffee breaks, over lunch and dinner, as well as during the conference. People freely 
and easily confided in me their stories of migration or traumatic experiences they had in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 http://www.inannafoundation.org/aboutus.html 
62 “Olmaması gereken birşeydi ama oldu, napalım”!
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Turkey. They were readily talking and asking about my knowledge of Seyfo, which 
was minimal. Several people there told me that they were banned from Turkey due to 
the precarious area of research they conducted, such as engaging in activism around the 
recognition of Seyfo or being involved in archival projects that found documents that 
were contradictory to the state narratives of the nation of Turkey.  
 
Nearly everyone was a Süryani-Keldani. I was surprised to find out that even those 
participants who were born in Turkey and lived there until their teenage years had 
never returned for a visit, nor had a desire to visit Turkey. It was a sort of ethnography, 
and quite a condensed one too, as I often refer to it as “thesis camp” because I learned 
so much in such little time, and noted down a wealth of resources, such as articles on 
language, history, or knowledge of the existence of MARA, the Modern Assyrian 
Research Archive, the sort of information that I had not been able to glean from 
fieldwork in Turkey, and find out about the implications of Seyfo on the population, 
which was the subject of the conference.  
 
The field in Rijssen was significant in many ways, one of which was the nature of the 
interlocutors. People who participated in the conference and whom I talked to 
contributed to the analysis by enlarging its scope and theory. The ethnography that I 
conducted by participating in this conference was a type of fieldwork that Marcus 
describes as “para-ethnographic”. 
 
 
 
5.1. Evolution of Ethnographic Thought and Para-ethnography 
 
 
In order to see the distinction of the fieldwork I conducted in Rijssen, it is important to 
review main tenets of anthropology and the evolving concepts of interlocutors, 
ethnographer and the field over the years. The discipline of anthropology has not 
ceased to re-evaluate its methodology. Ethnographic inquiry began with the experiential 
account in which the anthropologist had ultimate ethnographic authority, enabled by 
her removal from the scene of encounter which legitimized an observational distance 
that was deemed necessary for ethnographic accounts. The anthropologist, being 
unfamiliar with the methods of the so-called “natives” observed their actions and tried 
to deduce the meaning underlying actions. The experiential account was problematic 
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because it failed to account for the positionality of the anthropologist, whose nature was 
defined as a tabula rasa by profession. It did not account for the internal meaning-
making mechanisms within the community, let alone the influence of political, 
historical and economic circumstances. Ethnographer’s account had ultimate authority. 
 
Geertz introduced the concept of interpretive turn by pointing out the significance of 
“thick description” (Geertz 1973). He claimed that an experiential account was lacking 
because at best it saw and noted an eye blink, but it failed to tell apart a wink from a 
twitch, thus drawing attention to the contextual social information that was needed in 
order to interpret the meanings of actions. Interpretive analysis was an attempt to attach 
meaning to the observational data that was specific, circumstantial, and contextual. It 
tried to understand the meaning of actions in their specific contexts, instead of making 
claims as to their meanings as experiential anthropologists tried to do. It desired to 
understand the hierarchy of meaningful structures that guided people’s actions. It was 
able to account for context and meaning. It involved a constant tacking between the 
emic and etic point of view—isolation of gestures and their contextualization within the 
community. However, even though it expanded analysis, it still confirmed the authority 
of the ethnographer as she was still the sole arbiter of culturally meaningful data, and 
had the ultimate authority to decide what aspects will get recorded into an 
ethnographical analysis and what aspects shall be discarded. 
 
Interpretive analysis was also lacking because while concentrating on the semiotics of 
meaning within the community, it failed to account for wider phenomena, such as 
economic, political and historical circumstances. There was also the problem of 
accuracy. In 1980s, Clifford criticized interpretive analysis by pointing to its failure 
inhabit the plurality of voices within the field, and its tendency to reduce experience 
into the authority and voice of a single observer. According the Clifford, the 
interpretive technique failed to exhibit the dialogic and intersubjective nature of the 
experience, and reduced a complex world to serve the purposes of the anthropologist, 
hence creating a problem of verifiability (Clifford 1983). Clifford thought that there 
were many other contradictory voices within the field that needed to be voiced, leaving 
the reader to arrive at her own conclusions, thus challenging the ethnographer’s 
authority. The writing of ethnography needed to reflect the dialogical and polyphonic 
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aspects of experience, in order to open up the text to multiple interpretations beyond 
that of the ethnographer.  
 
Marcus describes the characteristics of the last two decades of ethnographic analysis 
that followed Clifford’s intervention of dialogy and polyphony as messy baroque 
(Marcus 2007). He uses this term in order to demonstrate that recent research has 
stretched the boundaries and constantly contested the limitations and problems within 
the discipline of anthropology, however it has failed to overcome the notions that it 
finds problematic through experimentation. In fact, Marcus demonstrates the 
similarities of the last two decades of ethnographic writing, and their desire to abide by 
a “highly symbolic aesthetic” (Marcus 2007:1129) and hence their failure to be 
experimental in form. For example, the concerns with ethnographic authority that 
created concepts of dialogy and polyphony have not given rise to a novel way of 
writing ethnography in which anthropologists share the authority, but rather have given 
rise to another form of “exemplary” ethnography in which the authority still rests with 
the ethnographer, an even though multi-sited, it is still the ethnographer that defines and 
finds the fields of research. 
 
Marcus also is critical of the way anthropology has often tended to look for knowledge 
by pushing itself into cultural history research and archives, rather than delving  
farther into the field. Marcus sees a need to pay attention to the networks arising out of 
the field. Even though messy baroque works describe “amazing dynamic tableaus”, 
according to Marcus, these works often fail to beckon the reader to argue with the 
ethnographer. Marcus says that these works are not “good tools to think with” (Marcus 
2007:1130). 
 
The problem with messy baroque arises not from the fact of textual representation, but 
from the problematic of research design. Marcus’s amendment to what he refers to as 
messy baroque is an abandonment of the fetish of “being there”, by paying attention to 
other forms of knowledge-production that occur around the field, and also by carrying 
and finding the off-stage work of archival research in the field. The research design has 
to embrace globality not simply by being multi-sited, but also by paying attention to the 
networks of knowledge and knowledge-production that occurs around/about the field. 
Marcus calls this new research design para-ethnography. 
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According to Marcus, para-ethnography is an ethnography done among a field of 
experts in which the traditional interlocutors play a more significant role than merely 
fitting in or resisting analysis as subjects. Instead of being interlocutors whose function 
is to be “thickly interpreted” by the anthropologist, in para-ethnography, interlocutors 
become active participants who engage in their own para-ethnographies, whose 
authorities, ideas and input shape and contribute to the research design itself, thus 
altering the nature of the relationship between the ethnographer and the interlocutors. In 
para-ethnography, the interlocutors become sources of information for the 
anthropologists, similar in their function to archives and other textual resources that 
have often served as “data”. “Data” has generally been treated as factual sources that 
ground, accompany, contradict or justify the ethnographic analysis in what Marcus 
refers to as messy baroque, hence different in their nature to ethnographic subjects that 
need to be thickly interpreted. Validity of data might be challenged or approved, 
ideological assumptions might be pointed out, but its epistemic nature is unlike that of 
an ethnographic subject in the messy baroque. Para-ethnography is an attempt for 
ethnography to develop its ideas within the field itself instead of through other sources 
that have traditionally served as data: 
 
   Current messy baroque genre finds its depth offstage not in the space/time 
of fieldwork, which still gives it traditional authority, but in the archive, in 
historical material, or accounts that pre-exist it. What I am advocating is to 
return this source of entanglement with material to fieldwork itself more so 
than to historical sources, given the interest of anthropologists in working in 
the contemporary and the temporality of emergence into near and unknown 
futures. (Marcus 2007:1131)  
 
Marcus says that para-ethnography is possible in a field where the ethnographer and the 
interlocutor share a “mutual interest of curiosity” (Marcus 2007:1137) and are engaged 
in a similar process of knowledge production. As an example to para-ethnography, 
Marcus and Holmes give the example of conducting ethnography in the Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) in a collaborative study (Holmes&Marcus 2005).  
 
FOMC is a body of individuals who make key decisions regarding the well being of the 
market, such as setting interest rates, by acting on a number of quantitative and 
qualitative data. Marcus and Holmes claim that the FOMC needs to engage in an 
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understanding of the market itself in order to act on it, and hence key decision-makers 
in the FOMC are engaged in sort of ethnography of their own field from which they 
draw important policy decisions (Holmes&Marcus: 246). When an anthropologist 
enters this field of experts who are engaging in a para-ethnography of the field, she 
becomes one among many people who are seeking data in order to reach a level of 
understanding about the field, be it a market or a group of individuals. Hence she is not 
the sole seeker of knowledge as often happens in messy baroque. Marcus and Holmes 
claim that this emplacement radically changes the dynamics between the ethnographer 
and the interlocutor. Interlocutors become key players of knowledge dissemination, 
similar in their nature to reference books or archives. Interlocutors of para-
ethnographies are also seeking knowledge, and not merely presenting themselves to the 
anthropologists, thereby sharing similar purposes with the anthropologists. Marcus and 
Holmes refer to this partnership as “epistemic partnership”.  
 
 
 
 
5.2. Para-ethnography in Rijssen 
 
 
The component of my research in Rijssen, among a community of Süryani-Keldani 
experts who had gathered for a conference about Süryani-Keldani history and 
particularly the genocide, is para-ethnographic, because it was an engagement with 
Süryani-Keldani academicians about furthering knowledge about Süryani-Keldani 
language, history, identity and politics. What marks the difference of this space, as 
opposed to the rest of the research in Turkey, is the expertise of the subjects on topics 
regarding specifically Süryani-Keldani. Sometimes expertise is marked by an academic 
distinction, such as a PhD, and at times by the intuitiveness, reflexiveness or 
involvement of the subject in the matter of concern.  
 
Fieldwork in such a setting helped me build the foundations of the historical component 
of the thesis by providing me with a list of resources regarding history of the Süryani-
Keldani from their own perspective, which was hard to come by through archival 
research in Turkey. My conversations with a linguist both helped me clarify the 
different linguistic trends within the community and its shaping throughout history, as 
well as the different meaning language has come to represent for the Süryani-Keldani 
! 73!
community in Europe, such as its importance in being a tool of ethnic unification. 
Another conversation seemed to resolve the ambiguities I was having about the proper 
way to refer to the community, as I have elaborated in the second chapter through 
referring to Efrem Yildiz, who thought the proper referral should be “Assyrian-
Chaldean”, and I argued that “Süryani-Keldani” is a better way to refer to the 
community in Istanbul, especially because of the connotations the term Assyrian has 
come to portend. Yildiz’s comments made sense and fit in the analysis; however, the 
field in Istanbul required a further interpretation of Yildiz’s method, giving rise to the 
depiction that I have come to employ in this thesis. This exchange of information with 
what had traditionally been an interlocutor defines a para-ethnography, an ethnography 
that drastically alters the nature of the interlocutor, as well as of the information. By its 
nature, the para-ethnographic information accorded to me by an epistemic partner was 
already thickly interpreted and contextualized within the political and social field. For 
example, the centrality of language to the diasporic community happened in the 
juncture in which the church was blamed for the institutional power struggles that 
caused ethnic separations. Hence, language had become the medium for claiming an 
ethnic unity. Equipped with the para-ethnography of a linguist, I could then find more 
signs that point to the centrality of language to the diaspora—such as the language 
training course that will be implemented by the Inanna Foundation in 2012, or the 
distinctiveness of a 17 year old in writing a book in Assyrian.  
 
The para-ethnography of the linguist expert was informative in providing me with an 
insight into the community. Integrating his analysis into my analysis that arose out of 
fieldwork in Turkey, I found out that there were major differences between the two 
communities. First of all, the community in Turkey very much described itself through 
ecclesiastic membership, such as “a member of the Chaldean Church”. The secular, 
non-religious feeling of being Süryani-Keldani in Rijssen did not exist to the extent that 
it did in Turkey, because people in Turkey felt a need also to identify with a Turkish 
national identity. Since religion is the only realm in which certain half-complete 
liberties are accorded to the community in İstanbul, religion had become the only 
legitimate basis of claiming any sort of distinction. The rhetoric of model minority 
clashed with the self-definitions of the community in Rijssen. Para-ethnography 
allowed me to understand these two basic contrasts between the population in İstanbul 
and the population in Rijssen. Since the two communities contrasted significantly, the 
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outspoken desires of a part of European community for an ethnic unification of all 
Süryani-Keldani worldwide, including the Süryani-Keldani in Turkey, was destined to 
clash at a certain point.  
 
This impending clash made itself apparent through the reactions towards Dora’s 
election, “Dora is not our representative” versus “Nobody would want to represent 
people who doubt their Süryani identity.” The thesis attempted to describe the 
community in İstanbul, since that is where most of the fieldwork was conducted. 
However, knowledge of the outspoken claims of a part of the diaspora, which are real 
and have a hold in Turkey to some extent, had to be factored into a description of the 
community in İstanbul. In the fourth chapter I tried to situate and understand both of 
these remarks, “Dora is not our representative” and “Nobody would want to represent 
people who doubt their Süryani identity” while also pointing out the ways in which 
they were both insufficient in speaking about the community at large. It was the para-
ethnography that ultimately made such a viewpoint possible. 
 
However, para-ethnography is not simply yet another perspective, or yet another site 
for the conduct of multi-sited ethnography. Para-ethnography is not just a method of 
finding analysis in the field, but it also claims the necessity of inserting analysis back 
into the field. According to Marcus, one of the most fundamental limits of what he 
often refers to as messy baroque has been the limits of its function. Marcus proposes 
that the new ethnographic project needs to weave reception back into the field, and 
develop positions of cultural critique from the emplacement of ethnography within the 
field (Marcus 2007, p.1133). This move allows ethnography to go beyond being a mere 
“analytic description for an archive or a reportage for an academic audience” (Marcus 
2007, p.1133). Hence ethnography develops a new role, that of mediation between 
different perspectives. This is essentially why I have persistently referred to the para-
ethnography in Rijssen as having been central in developing my ideas and framing 
arguments for the thesis. It was eventually the conflicting viewpoints and conceptions 
of what it means to a Süryani-Keldani (or Assyrian, from the perspective of the 
diaspora) that were made evident by the disagreements over naming and the previously 
noted dispute. This thesis not only situated itself on these conflicts, but also resolved to 
put back into the field a kind of knowledge by way of presenting the ethnographic 
findings of fieldwork in İstanbul to the ethnographic field of the conference in Rijssen. 
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This was a means of integrating analysis into the field, only to get it back again in the 
form of a field. Through the ethnography conducted in İstanbul and presence as an 
expert in the conference in Rijssen, I challenged conceptions of Assyrianism and why 
they may not be possible in a place such as Turkey, an issue that I have also tried to 
explain in this thesis. On the other hand, my presence within a field of experts informed 
me about issues that are central to my own analysis, yet those that I failed to hear, 
theorize and understand through ethnography in İstanbul, such as the centrality of 
Seyfo, that made para-ethnography indispensible as a method. It is this complex nature 
of feedback, challenges and mediations that para-ethnography ultimately stands for. 
 
I did not only learn from these epistemic partners, but I also discussed issues in order to 
confirm or challenge my knowledge arising out of fieldwork, as well as challenging the 
field in Rijssen about their ideas of what it means to be a Süryani-Keldani. Unlike the 
generally one-way information exchange that happens in a messy baroque, my presence 
in the field of the conference in Rijssen, and presentation of my ethnographic findings 
was essentially a para-ethnography through the method it emplaced a field within 
another field, and through its presence it both challenged the field in Rijssen and in turn 
challenged the field in İstanbul, by factoring each into one another, hence enabling 
thicker descriptions than what were possible earlier. It was through these meditations 
that I was able to theorize and situate reactions to Dora’s election. 
 
The interaction that took place in Rijssen went beyond mere co-presence and had 
further implications in terms of knowledge-production. Through her presence within a 
para-ethnographic field, the expert develops and evolves her ideas, which in turn is 
reflected in her work. This was the case with me, as what I learned from experts 
significantly altered this thesis. For example, I understood the differing meaning and 
significance of language and church, and learned about the ways in which minority 
rights claims made in the diaspora defined a proper ethnic subject that failed to coincide 
with the subjects in İstanbul. I learned about the underpinnings of Seyfo that were never 
vocalized. This was also the case with the other expert participants to the workshop, 
who learned from what I had to say, such as the conditioning of fear in Turkey and the 
dynamics of being a “model minority,” issues that they no longer need to deal with and 
hence might not integrate into their analysis while constructing and defending a 
particular Süryani-Keldani ethnic identity. Hence the distinction between 
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anthropologists (me) and interlocutors (Süryani-Keldani experts) was made completely 
murky, as we both taught and learned from each other, and as we all influenced each 
other’s work. The relationship was rather that of an epistemic partnership, each 
growing her knowledge through the knowledge of the other, each challenging and 
enlargening the fields of the other, and each factoring one another into the expansion of 
analysis. 
 
Marcus warns the ethnographers of complicity while doing para-ethnography. Even 
though the interlocutors and the ethnographer might be interested in knowledge 
production, they might have different intentions for doing so. Being engaged in 
knowledge production with experts, it is possible that the ethnographer become too 
complicit within the agendas of the experts, which in this case is the definition and 
restoration of an Assyrian identity. I argue that ethnography in İstanbul allowed me to 
see through the ideological perspectives of the experts within para-ethnography. The 
experts are implicated within social, political, historical and psychological fields 
themselves. Intentions of the experts and ethnographers might differ. Experts in Rijssen 
ultimately shared desires of a certain form of national, ethnic or linguistic unification, a 
desire that has political connotations, directs research in a particular direction and 
charts a particular prototypical Assyrian subject. Due to belonging to different churches 
and living in different countries, language had become the most defining character of 
being an Assyrian—even though Assyrianism is propounded to be something bigger 
than language—an ethnicity, a culture, a way of living. Such a view of the proper 
ethnic subject clashes with the self-imaginings of the community in İstanbul as I 
studied through ethnography, which is one of the central concepts that this thesis 
situates itself on, that is, the problems associated with creating prototypical ethnic 
subjects that often occur in attempts at multiculturalism. 
 
If I had only conducted fieldwork within the community of experts in Rijssen, I would 
have failed to assess the conditions of the population in Turkey. In wanting to bring 
into the expert discussions in Rijssen something that they are not thinking of or living 
under—conditioning of state repression and ensuing environment of fear—I took on a 
different role, and decided to share my knowledge of the conditions of fear and 
repression that continue to frame the existences of Süryani-Keldani in İstanbul, by 
drawing attention to ethnography, such as the fear of bombs, or fearing unfamiliar faces 
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in church due to the threat Christian subjects of the nation live under, and the numerous 
attacks on Christian establishments. Most people carefully listened to the things I had to 
say about the community in Istanbul, and perhaps realized and appreciated the liberties 
they have abroad. Someone said, “I never want to go back to Turkey again. There are 
things you cannot say there. I cannot live with that anymore.” I looked at the camera 
and thought that people would fear being framed for their opinions, especially about 
Seyfo, in Turkey. I tried to explain the conditions that lead to certain modes of 
behavior, such as reluctance to speak language or insist on minority rights, which 
eventually lead to forms of existence that an outsider might have defined as “lacking” 
or even “assimilated” if she failed to realize the affective conditions of the historical 
present. It is this sort of information that attempted to affect the ideas of the expert 
field. 
 
The ethnography I conducted in İstanbul was crucial in seeing through the political 
projects of the experts in Rijssen; meanwhile the para-ethnographic fieldwork with 
experts in Rijssen helped me understand the ways in which a Süryani-Keldani identity 
could develop if it had not been for the specific circumstances of Turkey, and more 
specifically İstanbul. Experts’ unified version of what it means to be an Assyrian did 
not jive with those of others due to extensive political, historical, economical and 
psychological conjectures, and ethnography in İstanbul allowed me to separate myself 
from being too complicit within the ideologies of experts, meanwhile helping me 
understand the ways in which people in İstanbul are restricted as a result of their 
circumstances. In this way, the experts in Rijssen played a much more different role 
than being simply interlocutors. 
 
Despite the danger of complicity, para-ethnography was extremely useful in 
overcoming the difficulties of being an “outsider”. Often times in fieldwork in İstanbul 
I realized that the passage of information was being interrupted as a result of my 
position as an “outsider” to the community, that is my lack of personal and inherited 
ties to the church and the community. This was pronounced in the choice of pronouns 
in people’s speeches. The fact of being an outsider has been a constant concern and had 
to be factored into any exchange. Para-ethnography in Rijssen allowed me to discuss 
certain things that I had not been able to discuss before.  Para-ethnography among 
experts allowed a professional, as well as contextual and psychological distance to 
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topics that had been too intimate or political for people in İstanbul to talk about. The 
workshop I attended in Rijssen was centered around Seyfo. The director of the Inanna 
Foundation began his introductory speech about the conference by quoting the 
following excerpt from Primo Levi,  
 
“Never forget that this has happened. 
Remember these words. 
Engrave them in your hearts, 
When at home or in the street, 
When lying down, when getting up. 
Repeat them to your children. 
Or may your houses be destroyed, 
May illness strike you down, 
May your offspring turn their faces from you.” 
 
Primo Levi, If This is Man 
 
Seyfo underpins and imprint every sort of scientific inquiry into Süryani-Keldani in 
Rijssen. This particular perspective on Seyfo was incredibly useful for me because it 
told me that I need to talk about, discuss and situate Seyfo into my thesis, even though 
most people in İstanbul had been completely quiet about it.   Due to the history of fear 
and state oppression, and uncertainties about future securities, topics such as Seyfo, a 
history telling that goes against the national history telling and by its secrecy and 
inrecognition inevitably are acts of resistance that not everyone wishes to engage in, 
especially to a person who is not from the community. However, para-ethnography 
allowed me to situate myself as an academician among other academicians, therefore 
allowing me access to knowledge production around Seyfo. I could also ask and talk 
about questions such as, “what does it mean when somebody denies that Seyfo took 
place?” or “which communities were effected and upon what basis?” Para-ethnography 
allowed me to deal with the obstacles of having been an outsider by allowing access to 
information that had not been revealed in fieldwork, but was revealed by the same 
people’s relatives living abroad.  
 
There are experts in Turkey as well, even though they may not have academic titles or 
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be conducting research about Assyrians in a public way. During my conversations with 
a Süryani-Keldani who had spent a lot of time in a monastery and researched into the 
historical and religious past, he mentioned how “there are two different communities as 
you will notice. People who have moved to Istanbul earlier on and the community that 
moved to Istanbul very recently”. I had made a similar observation earlier on, but to 
hear it confirmed ethnographically by someone from the community also made my 
ethnographic authority to talk about that distinction within the community stronger. 
This is also a perfect example of the changing dynamic in the field of ethnography, 
while as an anthropologist I rely on the interlocutor’s confirmation of the authority of 
my ethnographic findings, hence redefining interlocutor as an epistemic partner.  
 
 
 
5.3. Looking Ahead 
 
 
I would like to take an aside at this point and engage in some observations and 
comparisons between the Süryani-Keldani population in İstanbul and Süryani-Keldani 
population in Rijssen, as well as a preliminary analysis of the hierarchies among 
minorities in Istanbul. It is important to realize that the following thoughts are musings 
and possible venues of further research rather than ethnographic findings. In particular, 
I would like to draw attention to the interaction between and within the community in 
Europe at large and the community in Turkey, how they induce changes in one another, 
how they evolve within purview of one another albeit within their own conditions of 
possibilities, as well as the quintessence of multi-sited research within an interactive 
community of diasporic populations. 
 
Group of experts in Rijssen have an effect in influencing the community in the diaspora 
as much as their positions are defined by the conditions of the diaspora. Even though I 
have not conducted extensive ethnography in the diaspora, the internet searches, 
websites and online magazines are filled with the Assyrian flag and revived ancient 
symbols (http://www.nineveh.com/, http://www.bethsuryoyo.com/).  The community in 
Rijssen, even though heterogeneous in itself, is much more vocal about ethnic identity 
than the population in İstanbul and often imagine mythological ties to the Assyrian 
empire of Mesopotamia. “I am named after one of the kings of Assyria” This feeling of 
being heir to the Assyrian empire exists in İstanbul to some level as well, even though it 
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is not a central part of self-definitions. The secular community in Rijssen often centers 
unification claims in their possession of a heritage to the Assyrian Empire which is 
manifest in their allegiance to the language of Suryoyo. The group of experts within 
which I conducted fieldwork often blamed the historical religious divisions for the 
ethnic fragmentation of the community, hence were trying to develop a sense of 
community that is based on language and a unified sense of ethnicity. Lack of 
religiosity in a part of the community in Rijssen contrasted significantly with the 
community in İstanbul, where religion was generally quite central to definition of self 
as Süryani-Keldani, primarily because that is the only cultural right that is accorded to 
the community officially, also being the basis on which most institutional 
discrimination centers itself.  
 
Community in the diaspora and community in İstanbul and Turkey influence one 
another. There is a passage of information, in the form of internet forums and the 
presence of strong ties to the diaspora in the form of families, and recently in the 
conference about Süryani-Keldani that is going to be held in Mardin in April 2012 in 
which experts from Turkey and abroad are going to interact. The exact nature of this 
passage of information and interaction will only be possible through further multi-sited 
and para-ethnographic fieldwork. It is this variety of connectedness and embeddedness 
within the historical present that results in the various and contentious self-depictions, 
such as Assyrian, Süryani, Süryani-Keldani, or Asurlu.  
 
The community in Turkey also needs to be conceptualized within the context of the 
ethnic Kurdish movement and active Armenian communities. Several people have 
voiced the importance of the Kurdish nationalist movement to Süryani-Keldani 
activism. The Armenian activism regarding the genocide is crucial to the Süryani-
Keldani as they have also suffered genocide. Endorsement of Erol Dora by BDP, a 
Kurdish party, also attests to the unified efforts of ethnic representation on both fronts. 
However, there are also hierarchies between minority populations. There is resentment 
within the Süryani-Keldani community about the lack of global knowledge of the 
Süryani-Keldani component of the massacres of Christians in 1915, and this resentment 
was especially prominent during the conference in Rijssen. Surely, there is local 
knowledge of the massacre of Süryani-Keldani, but it has failed to have a global reach 
such as the Armenian genocide. This is yet another component of how ethnic 
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hierarchies are created from within, and adds yet another layer to the discourse of 
model minority. It is important to be cognizant of these networks and hierarchies in 
ethnographic research, and these hierarchies create an interesting site for further 
fieldwork. In her work entitled “Retrieving the Dignity of a Cosmopolitan City”, Biner 
talks about the present manifestations of historic inter-communal relationships in the 
city of Mardin, providing a fascinating account of inter-communal relationships 
between Muslims, Kurds, Armenians and Süryani-Keldani. 
 
While doing research in İstanbul, I met a few people who were actively involved in the 
issues of ethnicity and ethnic unity, in a way that went beyond church attendance, and 
impelled them to take an active role in advancing ethnic rights. Mostly I did not have 
access to these people, who are either subdued, under cover, or elsewhere. I imagine 
this attitude to be more pronounced in Midyat and Mardin, who eventually elected a 
Süryani-Keldani as a member of the parliament63. However, in the diaspora in Rijssen I 
met people who are actively involved in attempting to build an ethnic identity. The 
widespread applications in Europe to assume the local last names which were changed 
to Turkish ones by the state of Turkey, and the overt attempts to recover and restore the 
native language attest to the desire to sustain and build an ethnic identity. In the 
fieldwork in Rijssen, I gained an understanding of these efforts at ethnic revival, and 
also developed a sensitive ear to similar attempts in İstanbul, albeit within their own 
conditions. Hence the fieldwork in Rijssen was informative in helping me lend an ear to 
such brewing claims and desires in Turkey. Süryani-Keldani community is inevitably 
influenced by minority rights claims of Kurds. Even though these connections remain 
unexplored in this thesis, the endorsement of Dora by BDP, a predominantly Kurdish 
party that represents the need to recognize and democratically engage with minority 
rights claims, and his election by mainly Kurdish votes—since there aren’t enough 
Süryani-Keldani to elect a member of the parliament of their own—attest to the 
interactions between these communities. 
 
A multi-sited research with ethnographic and para-ethnographic components allowed 
me to discern firsthand the globalization and networking of ideas, enabled by the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63 Election of Erol Dora was possible through his endorsement by BDP, the Kurdish 
party. Otherwise there are not enough Süryani-Keldani in Mardin to elect a member of  
the parliament on their own. 
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internet, travel, geographic and ideological proximity, and the inevitability of a multi-
sited ethnographic and para-ethnographic research design to ethnography.  
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